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BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR: HOW
ACCOUNTANTS AND CONGRESS CREATED
THE PROBLEM OF AUDITOR
INDEPENDENCE
SEAN M. O'CONNOR *
Abstract: Although corporate fraud is not held in check by our current
audit process, in which auditors lack independence from the clients they
inspect, numerous attempts to fix this problem have failed. This Article
analyzes the history of auditing, which has been neglected in legal
scholarship, to argue that the mandatory audit system created the
problem of auditor independence. Accountants advocated for the system
in order to gain the status of a learned profession; however, they received
more than they bargained for. In particular, auditors incurred an
obligation to the "investing public," but this undefined group does not
actually control the auditors. Auditors answer to the companies being
audited. The resulting conflict of interest has proven to be insur-
mountable. This Article argues that the problem will be resolved only by
returning to its origins in the federal securities laws of the 1930s and by
restructuring the relationships involved in public company audits.
INTRODUCTION
Anxious to respond quickly to the public outcry over the recent.
financial scandals that had rocked the national economy, the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency (the "Senate Committee") gath-
ered in Room 301 of the Senate Office Building to hear testimony on a
quickly drafted bill to regulate the securities industry. The bill required
companies issuing securities to issue derailed financial statements that
would be certified by company directors. In turn, these directors would
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then take on unlimited personal liability for the contents of the
certified statements. The bill was quite controversial, yet the public de-
manded sweeping reform, and such reform could not be painless.
During the hearings, experts testified that the boardrooms of
American companies would empty as even the most conscientious di-
rectors would refuse to take on the risk of such liability. Perhaps direc-
tors could be given a defense of good faith reliance on the opinions of
certified public accountants or other qualified professionals. Who then
would be on the hook for inaccuracies in the financial statements? The
point was to have someone in control of the company take responsibil-
ity for the contents of the financial statements in order to counter the
temptation for the company to spin the statements for its own ends.
Colonel Arthur H. Carter, President of the New York State Society
of Certified Public Accountants, appeared before the Senate Commit,
tee and suggested that the bill be amended to require a company issu-
ing stock to have its financial statements certified by an accountant,
rather than simply to allow the government to call for an audit of a
company after any suspicions arose) After all, he testified, eighty-five
percent of the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (the
"NYSE") already voluntarily underwent outside audits. 2 The Senate
Committee was skeptical and asked the following questions:
"How much more and additional employment would that
give to certified accountants?"
"Do you think it proper to insert in there that these inde-
pendent public accountants should be privileged to state
their opinion as to the value of securities or the condition of
the company?"
"Do you not think it is more in the interest of the public that
is to buy these securities, if there is to be any check up or any
guarantee as to the correctness, that it he done by some
Government agency rather than by some private association
of accountan ts?"5
1
 See Securities Act of 1933: Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 73rd Cong. (1933) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Col. Arthur 1-1. Carter), re-
printed in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF' 1933 AND SECURITIES ACT OF
1934, at 56-62 (comp. by J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar, 1973) [hereinafter LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY].
2 See id. at 56,60.
3 Id. at 56.
4 Id.
s Id. at 57.
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"Who audits you?"8
By the time the bill was enacted into law, however, Colonel Car-
ter's suggestion was included—intentionally or otherwise—as part of
Schedule A to the Securities Act of 1933 (the '33 Act"). 7 Financial
statements would have to be certified by an "independent public or
certified accountant" prior to any public offering of securities. 8 But
there was a catch: section 11 of the '33 Act provides investors with a
civil cause of action against most of the parties involved in preparing
registration statements—expressly including accountants—with dam-
ages measured as the loss in value of the securities purchased. 9
The certification requirement resulted in a windfall of business for
the developing accounting profession, only somewhat tempered by the
liability provisions. The accountants seemed happy; Congress seemed
pleased with itself; and the public appeared mollified. After all, profes-
sional audits were already a part of the business landscape—especially
after expanding in the mid-1800s in tandem with the spiraling com-
plexity of businesses and financial markets touched off by the new fac-
tories and production methods of the Industrial Revolution. 18 So why
not just adopt the practice officially through federal legislation?
The problem was that by codifying a relatively new "best prac-
tice," which was employed by only a subset of stock-issuing companies,
in a federal law that mandated this practice for all companies, Con-
gress commodified and thus, destroyed the real premium-signaling
value of the practice. Further, it froze in time an experiment in con-
trolled public disclosure of what had been heretofore very much pri-
vate audits commissioned by the company, its shareholders, or credi-
tors for only their eyes.
Additionally, Congress seemed to have included some of the
audit provisions from the various British Companies Acts without a
full understanding of the long history and context in which those
provisions developed. It is true that British companies at the time
were required to have an auditor review the proposed financial state-
ments and reports of the directors of the company before they be-
came finalized. These audit reports then .could be used in public of-
6 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 58 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
7 Pub. L. No. 73-22,48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000))
(also known as the "Fletcher-Rayburn Securities Act of 1933" and the "Truth in Securities
Act").
8 15 U.S.C. § 77na, sched. A,1 25.
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k. Some limitations on this liability are discussed infra notes 310-441.
16 See infra notes 22-238 and accompanying text.
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ferings of stock. This "auditor," however, was an officer of the com-
pany, although only in the auditor capacity, and did not have to be an
accountant. In fact, the company auditor officer position belonged to
a well-established heritage that included trusted servants in English
manorial households who were responsible for monitoring other ser-
vants' use of household assets. Auditors also might have been towns-
people elected to monitor a government official's use of public as-
sets." The real requirements for an individual to be appointed a
company auditor were that the individual could not also have been a
director or officer of the company and that the individual must have
been elected or appointed by the shareholders at the annual meeting.
Thus, in the British system, professional accountants were still
working under private commission for parties who were investigating
the accounting of others. Of particular note, accountants were hired
by the "auditor" (shareholder) of a British company to help that audi-
tor examine the directors' reports. Under the '33 Act, however, U.S.
companies were only required to have an "independent public or
certified accountant" review the financial statements for a registration
statement. Because it was not specified otherwise, the job of commis-
sioning the accountant fell to company management, even though
they were part of the very group that the certification or audit process
was supposed to monitorl
Finally, based on the stated investor focus of the '33 Act—em-
phasizing the principle of caveat venditor as much as the more tradi-
tional securities industry principle of caveat emptat courts and com-
mentators have maintained consistently that accountants certifying
statements under the '33 Act" are acting as much on behalf of the
public trust as they are for their paying client, the company." This
bifurcated allegiance, however, was bound to promote conflict and
controversy." Agents cannot successfully serve two principals with po-
tentially adverse interests, The concept of "auditor independence"
and the labyrinthian rules promulgated to try to define and enforce it
II See infra notes 22-238 and accompanying text.
12
 This claim also has been made under the similar annual certification required by
rules promulgated under the later Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Pub. L. No. 73-291,
48 Slat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-781M11 (2000)).
13 Sec infra notes 447-489 and accompanying text.
14 See generally Sean M. O'Connor, The Inevitability of Enron and the Impossibility of "Audi-
tor Independence" Under the Cunrnt Audit System (2002), available at httpi//papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=303181 (date posted Mar. 11, 2002).
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have arisen as major issues, primarily because of this legally mandated
divided allegiance of auditors.
Part I of this Article proceeds by clarifying the development of
accounting into a profession through the dawn of the twentieth cen-
tury.r° Part II looks at the profession in the early decades of that cen-
tury and focuses on its quest for greater prestige and increased service
engagements. 1° This Part also describes the profession's move into the
lobbying arena, culminating in its role in the passage of the Income
Tax Act of 1913. 17 Part III discusses the circumstances and debate sur-
rounding the passage of the '33 Act.i° Finally, Part IV considers devel-
opments after the '33 Act, including passage of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 19 (the "'34 Act"), and rulemaking under both laws
that followed the lead of the certification requirement of the '33
Act. 2° The Article concludes by arguing that Congress unwittingly cre-
ated the problem of auditor independence when—at the accountants'
own request—it included the financial statement certification re-
quirement in the '33 Act. 21
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACCOUNTING INTO A PROFESSION
A. Brief Histou of Accounting
The beginning of modern accounting, in the form of double-entry
bookkeeping, dates back to the end of the fifteenth century, 22 but it was
not until the nineteenth century that the true systems of accounting
developed.25 Further, prior to the mid-nineteenth century few indi-
viduals held themselves out as "public accountants," meaning that.
they practiced their craft through their own proprietary businesses.
19 See infix  notes 22-238 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 239-285 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 286-310 and accompanying text.
SCC infra notes 311-446 and accompanying text.
19 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hhh (2000),
20 Sec infra notes 447-473 and accompanying text.
21 Sec infra notes 474-490 and accompanying text.
22 SCCA.C. LITTLETON, ACCOUNTING EVOLUTION TO 1900, at 12-21 (3rd ed., Garland
Pill:11'g, Inc. 1988). In 1494, an Italian monk named Fra Luca Pacioli formalized and cata-
logued the then-current state of bookkeeping, including a description of early double-
entry bookkeeping, in his book Summa de Arithmetica Geometria, Proportion' et Proportioni-
nalita. Sec Richard H. Macve, Pacioli's Legacy, in ACCOUNTING HISTORY FROM THE RENAIS-
SANCE: A REMEMBRANCE to LUCA ['Amin.' 3-30 (TA. Lee et al. eds., 1996) (hereinafter
Accourrrioo HisToRv].
29 See LITTLETON, supra note 22, at 165; see alsojoim L. CAREY, Tor Rtsr or THE Ac-
couNTING PROFESSION: FROM TECHNICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL., 1896-1936, at 17-19 (1969).
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Even fewer individuals were able to have a public accounting practice
as their only source of income. 24
 Others who considered themselves
accountants or bookkeepers were likely full-time employees of the
sundry business enterprises of the day.25 In fact, one major accounting
historian has suggested that there were no real accountants before the
nineteenth century, only bookkeepers."
With the advent of the Industrial Revolution and the concomitant.
shift from an agrarian to a capital intensive, industrial economy, busi-
ness and financial structures became markedly more complicated. This
required more rigorous theories and systems of bookkeeping, which, in
turn, led to formal accounting." The passage of early modern corpora-
tion law statutes in Great Britain and the United States came in tandem
with this economic shift. 28
 Some of the most salient features of these
new statutes included the perpetual existence of a duly formed and
maintained corporation, and an allowance for the entity to have a
broadly stated business purpose. 29
 The shift from limited term business
partnerships that effected one specific venture—for instance, a single
overseas trade expedition—to perpetual corporations with ongoing
ventures, prompted the shift from so-called "agency bookkeeping" to
"proprietorship bookkeeping."'" This shift, in turn, caused bookkeep-
ing to evolve into accounting by "transforming a mere method of sys-
tematically recording exchanges into a means of giving business man-
agement an effective control over its affairs." 31
Of course, as the number and size of corporate industrial activi-
ties grew, the reach of their economic impact grew as well. As a result,
corporate industries increasingly had a financial impact on a greater
segment of the general public, including employees, managers,
24 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 18-19; LriTLE'roN, supra note 22, at 265.
25
 Today one such position is that of the company "controller" or "comptroller.* See A
HANDBOOK Or BUSINESS LAW TERMS 128-29,145 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 1999).
26 See LEITLETON, supra note 22, at 271-84,361-68. In fact, the title of "accomptant"
for an independent professional does not seem to appear in directories in England until
after 1766. Sec id. at 267.
27 John Richard Edwards, Financial Accounting Practice 1600-1970: Continuity and
Change, in ACCOUNTING 11 [STORY, supra note 22, at 31-45.
28 *JOEL SELIGMAN, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 3-18 (1995).
29 Sce id.
See LEITLETON, supra note 22, at 155-61. "Agency bookkeeping" developed from the
"charge and discharge" records kept by servants for masters arising in the medieval feudal
system and pertained simply to explaining the servant's activities with the master's goods
and property. Sec id; see also infra note 112 and accompanying text. "Proprietorship book-
keeping" focused instead on the "continuing investment of capital variously employed and
periodically summarized." See Iffrrirrot,t, supra note 22, at 156.
31 See LITELE•ON, supra note 22, at 165.
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shareholders, creditors, and debtors. 32 At the same time, extensive
formal capital markets were developing—notably in London 33—and
stock exchanges were beginning to list substantial numbers of corpo-
rate securities over and above their early focus on government securi-
ties." Within these markets, more investors from the general public
began buying corporate securities (particularly railway company
stock) and losing money through questionable circumstances that led
to declines in share value. Industries either had to regulate themselves
or suffer imminent government financial regulation.35 A number of
companies responded by issuing regular periodic financial statements
to shareholders." At the same time, new bankruptcy laws in England,
premised on some disastrous failings of rail and other ventures,
helped to create a new market for individuals skilled in bookkeeping
and early accounting methods. 37 Nevertheless, the new corporate
structure also was used to defraud investors outright through worth-
less or "watered" stock issued from sham corporations."
In England, one important response to the foregoing problems
was the passage of an interrelated system of statutes, often referred to
generally as the "Companies Acts," beginning in the mid-1800s. The
lineage of these statutes actually extends further back to the South
Sea Bubble of the early 1700s. During the peak of this well-known ex-
ample of early speculative frenzy in stock trading, Parliament passed a
law reasserting the restriction of incorporation authority to the Crown
and Parliament." The Bubble Act expressly authorized King George
32 See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 3-18; see also LITTLETON, supra note 22, at 205-22.
33 Sec CARES', supra note 23, at 18; Edwards, supra note 27, at 36. Note that the Indus-
trial Revolution connnenced in England before it was brought to the United States. Thus,
in many corporate and securities law advances, developments occurred in England before
appearing in the United States.
34 See Edwards, supra note 27, at 35-40.
15 See id. The explosive growth of the rail system in England led to one of the earliest
episodes when capital requirements were so great that investment by a significant portion
of the general public was necessary. See id. It would appear that episodes such as this—
despite the ensuing scandals—actually whetted the public's appetite for corporate securi-
ties investment, as some individuals watched others become fabulously rich off a few well-
placed investments.
36 Sec id.
37 ScclArrirroN, supra note 22, at 271-84.
36 See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 11-16 (stating that the bubble was a result of a myr-
iad of companies attempting to offer shares to the public in emulation of the success of
the South Sea Company).
" See Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison,
23 U. PA. J. INI•'L ECON. L. 791,806-07 (2002); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L.
REv. 77,94-96 (2003). Because European countries traditionally viewed incorporation as
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to grant charters for two companies: the first company would be for
the purpose of assuring ships and merchandise at sea, and the second
company would be for the purpose of "lending money on bot-
tomry."40
 In addition, the Bubble Act flatly extinguished virtually all
other existing companies that were not created under a valid royal
charter or parliamentary act. It also prohibited any new corporations
from forming, or "presuming to act as corporate bodies," without
enabling charters or statutes.'" The Bubble Act actually may have pre-
cipitated the disastrous bursting of the South Sea Bubble, or it simply
may have been concomitant with it. One commentator, however, has
suggested that it was the first example of a recurrent pattern of eco-
nomic boom, bust, and over-reactive regulation. 42
It took more than a hundred years for Parliament to move past its
concerns over unregulated "joint stock companies"43
 and repeal the
Bubble Act via the Bubble Companies Act of 1825. 44
 Parliament's re-
ward for doing so was the unbridled "railway mania" speculation of
the 1830s and 1840s alluded to above. Thus, Parliament yet again was
• prompted to pass legislation to restrict joint stock companies. This
time, however, it responded with regulation rather than prohibition.
possible only by permission of the sovereign—the "concession" system—individuals in
Great Britain simply had no rights to incorporate without such a concession prior to the
1800s. See Pistor et al, supra, at 806-07. They nonetheless found ways to skirt this general
restriction, sometimes by buying charters from "moribund" companies. Id. at 806. The
passage of the Bubble Act itself seemed to suggest that, at other times, enterprising indi-
viduals simply waffled on the form of their business venture, running the grey area be-
tween a large partnership and a true "corporation"—with or without legal authority: See
6 Geo., c. 18 (1719) (Eng.). Thus, there was a need to 'reassert" the exclusive authority of
the sovereign.
40
 6 Geo., c. 18. The first granting power clearly was directed to restrict the power to
create any more overseas trading expeditions, such as the original South Sea Company, to
the Crown. "Bottonary" is the maritime law term for secured lending transactions for use,
equipment, or repair of a ship, using the ship itself (or its keel or "bottom") as security.
BLACK'S LAW DicrioNARY 197 (8th ed. 2004). In the event that the ship was lost during a
specified journey or time period, the lender lost his money. See id.
41
 6 Geo., c. 18. The captions of the relevant sections of the Bubble Act state, "After 24
June 1720, all undertakings tending to the prejudice of trade, and all subscriptions, &c.
thereto, or presuming to act as corporate bodies without legal authority, and all acting
under obsolete charters, Sec. shall be deemed illegal and void." Id.
42 See Ribstein, supra note 39, at 96.
43
 "An unincorporated association of individuals possessing common capital, the capi-
tal being contributed by the members and divided into shares, of which each member
possesses a number of shares proportionate to the member's investment.' BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, Sitpra note 40, at 298.
44 6 Geo. 4, c. 91 (Eng.).
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In particular, the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 45 provided
that companies could choose to incorporate without royal charter or
parliamentary act ("free registration" or "free incorporation"), pro-
vided they registered with the Registry Office, an entity newly created
by the Act, in compliance with a prescribed schedule of information. 49
Further, the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 required that registra-
tion occur before any "Prospectus, Handbill, or Advertisement" was
distributed to the public. 47 Upon the filing of the registration form, a
company would receive a provisional certificate of incorporation, but.
could not receive its "Certificate of complete registration" until cer-
tain other formalities were executed in writing by shareholders, 48 The
Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 contains an interesting combina-
tion of regulations anticipating, and influencing, U.S. federal securi-
ties laws, much of which is clearly directed toward protecting share-
holders. 49 Of relevant note is a provision for audits and auditors to be
elected by the shareholders, which will be discussed in Part I.13, to-
gether with the further evolution of this statute."
The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 expressly did not extend
to either "charter" or "statutory" companies. 5 i Because Parliament was
creating an increasing number of statutory companies, however, it
apparently was tiring of repeating what was becoming a standard lit-
any of provisions for governance of the companies. In response, it
passed the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act in 1845 (the "1845
Companies Clauses Act"). 52 This legislation also sought to codify nu-
merous provisions for the protection of shareholders, including re-
quirements for audits and auditors." Similarly, the Chartered Com-
panies Act of 1837 allowed the Crown to create corporations by ism-
45 7 & 8 Vict., C. 110 (Eng.).
46 See id. sched. C (setting forth prescribed information in Schedule C). This legisla-
tion moved England permanently away from the sole "concession" model of corporate
bodies and into the modern era of "free registration." See Pistol., supra note 39, at 806-07.
47 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110. Clearly, the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 established a fore-
runner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") and anticipated modern
securities regulation through registration and disclosure. See id. at § 4.
48 &C id. §§ 4, 7.
49 At the same time, England was not the first to move to free registration; that honor
fell to the State of New York in 1811. SeeAct of Mar. 22, 1811, ch. 67, 1811 N.1: Laws 151-52.
" Sec infra notes 106-230 and accompanying text.
51 Seel & 8 Vict., c. 110. That is, the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 did not extend
to those companies created by royal charter or Parliamentary act, respectively. Sec id.
82 8 & 9 Vict., C. 16 (Eng.); see also 8 HALSBURY'S STATUTES or ENGLAND AND WALES 8
(Andrew Davies ed.. 4th ed. 1999) [hereinafter HALSBURY'S STATtrur,s].
"See infm notes 106-238 and accompanying text.
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ing letters patent, rather than solely through the lengthier process of
granting a royal charter, so long as companies created by such letters
patent adhered to the provisions of the Act. 54 No express provision for
audits or auditors was included in this legislation, however. 55
Although the provisions for "auditors" in the Joint Stock Compa-
nies Act of 1844 and the 1845 Companies Clauses Act did not encom-
pass accountants specifically, as will be discussed below, company-
elected auditors increasingly hired and relied on public accountants
to fulfill their duties under these statutes. 56 Thus, this evolution in
corporate law in England provided still more work for accountants,
and yet another impetus to develop a true profession. Over time, ac-
countants—often "chartered accountants" as described below—were
elected directly as company auditors. 57
At the same time, the growing awareness of, and focus on, the
corporation as a distinct legal person led to a new perspective in ac-
counting—the "entity theory." This approach viewed bookkeeping as
"primarily concerned with accounting to 'outsiders' for all property
entrusted from without to 'the business' and dedicated to its pur-
poses."58
 Several scholars have noted that the "entity theory" was said
to be "quite opposite to the proprietorship theory, in which book-
keeping is viewed as an accounting by the proprietor for his own
property in detail and in total."59
 Ironically, this was also a shift away
from the relatively new "proprietorship accounting" back to the older
"agency accounting."80
This new accounting perspective comported with the growing
sense that some of the fundamental issues inherent in the new corpo-
rate forms were predicated on conflicted agency relationships. 8'
54 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 73, §§ 2-32 (Eng.).
55
 Overall, governance of the corporation is not as detailed in the Chartered Compa-
nies Act of 1837 as it is under either the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 or the 1845
Companies Clauses Act. This is perhaps because fewer corporations were being formed by
charter and/or because the Crown granted more deviation in governance structures
atnong its chartered companies than Parliament was granting in its statute companies. See
Companies Clauses Act, 1845,8 & 9 Vict., c. 16; Chartered Companies Act, 1837,7 Will. 4
& 1 Vict., c. 73.
56 See infra notes 106-238 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 106-238 and accompanying text.
56 LITTLETON, supra note 22, at 191.
59 Id.
66
 See id. at 193.
61
 This view finds its greatest expression much later, of course, in the seminal work by
Adolph A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means on the agency implications of separated own-
ership and management. Sec generally A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 112-16 (rev. ed. 1968) (1932).
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Whereas the earlier corporations had a relatively small number of
shareholders, the new corporations drew increasingly on unprece-
dented numbers of shareholders.62 As the stock exchanges became
more robust, allowing for a marvelous liquidity of many companies'
shares, the now ever-changing "shareholder" often became as fungible
as the shares he or she held.° Thus, the sense of the shareholder as
an "owner" of the business in any meaningful sense was rapidly dete-
riorating. This alteration in the conception of shareholders was sur-
prising given that one of the core purposes of the corporate model
was separating management froth ownership so that businesses could
draw on a far larger and more stable pool of capital than would be
available from even the largest viable partnership models of business.
Nonetheless, the shift had some profound and unexpected conse-
quences for the business and financial environment.
As discussed above, England embarked on a long and convoluted
path of three distinct corporate law lineages largely intended to pro-
tect shareholders through inter alma audit and auditor requirements
drawing upon the well-established British audit tradition." In con-
trast., no requirements for—or protections by way of—auditors ap-
peared to be available in the United States under either federal or
state law before the enactment of the federal securities laws in the
19305.65 At the same time, the United Stales initially lagged behind
Great. Britain in industrialization and the development of sophisti-
cated financial markets.°° Further, the United States largely avoided
some of the extreme stock speculative frenzies that roiled Great Brit-
ain and Europe,67 which may have limited the interest in regulating
corporations, securities, and accountants through legislation.
All of these factors arguably led to the development of an ac-
counting profession in the United States later than in Great Britain,
in terms of both numbers of accountants and formal organizations.°
Of particular note, the precursor to the Institute of Chartered Ac-
62 See LEITLETON, supra note 22, at 205-06.
65 See id. at 203.
64 See infra notes 106-238 and accompanying text.
65 See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 3-18.
66 See, e.g., R.R. PALMER & JOEL COU•ON, A Elts -ronv ot,"ruE MODERN WORLD 435 (6th
ed. 1984).
67
 Sec Lryrt.rroN, supra note 22, at 255.
68 See CAREY, SUP"' note 23, at 18-22,34 (noting, for example, 11 accountants listed in
London in 1799, growing to 210 by 1850; compared with 14 accountants in New York in
1850, growing to 115 by 1886).
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countants of Scotland (the "ICAS1) received a royal charter in 1854. 60
The accounting societies in England formed around the same time,
but did not receive their royal charter—as the unified Institute of
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (the "ICAEW")—until
1880. 70
 In the United States, the first formal association for public ac-
countants and precursor to the Anterican Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (the "AICPA") did not appear until 1887, and even then
it had no authority oilier than itself. 71
Similarly, although the ICAEIAT introduced mandatory qualifying
examinations in 1882 to regulate vho could adopt the title of Fellow
Chartered Accountant, 72 there ss itas no examination requirement—
private or public—in the United States until 1896. At that time, New
York passed a law to regulate accountants who desired to practice tin-
der the new title of "certified public accountant" ("CPA"). 75 Over the
69
 See id. at 19; MC also INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF SCOT., 1CAS Celebrates 150
Years, at http://wwwicas.org.uk/site/cms/v4_newsArticleViewasp?article---.2957 (last vis-
ited Oct. 1, 2004). The original charter was granted to the Society of Accountants in Edin-
burgh, while the Institute of Accountants and Actuaries in Glasgow received its royal char-
ter in 1855, and the Society of Accountants in Aberdeen received its royal charter in 1867.
See CAREY, supra note 23, at 19; sec also INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF SCOT., Supra.
Collectively, the societies were known as the "Chartered Accountants of Scotland," and
their members were the only individuals in the United Kingdom who could use the desig-
nation "Chartered Accountant" or "CA." See CAREY, supra note 23, at 19; see also INST. OF
CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF SCOT., SUPra. jA Supplemental Charter in 1951 merged the
three societies and gave rise to the current name. See CAREY, supra note 23, at 19; sec also
INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF SCOT., supra.
7° See CAREY, sn/an note 23, at 19-20; sec also INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENG.
& WALES, Governance and Stnteture• History and Overview, at http://www.icaew.co.uk/
index.cfm?AUB=TB2I 49070,MNX.1_490708.4oute=11295,P,11388,11389,49070 (last visited
Oct. 1, 2004). Local societies in London, Liverpool, Manchester, and Sheffield were merged
to create the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (the "ICAEW"). See
CAREY, supra note 23, at 19; MC also INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENG. & WALES,
SUM.
Sec CAREY, SUM note 23, at 22; see also AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS,
Summary of A1CPA Operations, at http://wwwaicpa.org/about/summary.htm
 (last visited
Oct. 1, 2004),
72 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 20, 39. "Fellow Chartered Accountant" ("FCA") signified
a partner or proprietor in practice, while "Associate Chartered Accountant" ("ACA")
signified a qualified member of an FCA's staff, or a member of the ICAEW not in active
practice. Both FCAs and ACAS might be referred to casually as "chartered accountants." See
id. at 20; MC also INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENG. & WALES, supra note 70.
73
 Act of Apr. 17, 1896, ch. 312, 1896 N.Y. Laws 263-64. The original law required
those seeking the 'certified public accountant" ("CPA") designation, including use of the
abbreviation "C.P.A." or any similar "words, letters or figures" that would indicate the same
(1) to be either U.S. citizens, or to have declared an intention to so become, (2) to reside
or to have a place of regular business in New Ibrk, (3) to be over the age of twenty-one,
and (4) to be of good moral character. Id. at § 1. Certification authority fell to the Regents
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next decade, similar laws followed in Pennsylvania, 74 Maryland, 75 Cali-
fornia, 76 Washington," Illinois, 78 New Jersey,79 Florida,80 and Michi-
gan.81 Of important note for later development, however, the U.S.
state laws granted certification authority to certification boards not
linked directly to either the accountant's local or national profes-
sional associations. This bifurcation of the certification process from
the professional association arguably weakened the ability of either
state or professional authorities to police issues such as auditor inde-
pendence effectively ,. By comparison, the accounting professions in
Scotland, on the one hand, and England and Wales, on the other,
each have a unitary source of certification and association, as well as
the express (and enforceable) public interest mandate of royal char-
tered organizations. 82
A major additional benefit of royal chartering to the U.K. ac-
counting organizations was 'the prestige attaching to [royal char-
ters].'"83 Chartering further operated as a device to separate individu-
als with specific training and expertise in accounting from the increas-
of the University of the State of New York. Sec id. at §§ 1-2; People v. Marlowe, 203 N.YS,
474, 474 (Ct. Sp. Sess. 1923). The Regents were empowered to create a board of examin-
ers, that would be comprised of three members, all of whom were to be CPAs beginning
after 1897. See Act of Apr. 17, 1896, § 2. Certification could be revoked for cause after no-
tice and a hearing. See id. The examination requirement could be waived only for public
accountants in practice for at least one year before passage of the Act, provided that such
accountant applied for waiver within one year after passage of the Act. See id. at § 3. Viola-
tions of the Act were made misdemeanors. See id. at § 4.
74 SecAct of Mar, 29, 1899, No. 17, 1899 Pa. Laws 21-22.
75 Scc Act of Apr. 10, 1900, ch. 719, 1900 Md. Laws 1148-1149.
See Act of Mar. 23, 1901, ch. 213, 1901 Cal. Stat. 645-646.
77 Sec Act of Mar, 12, 1903, ch. 72, 1903 Wash. Laws 99-101.
78 Sec Act of May 15, 1903, 1903 111. Laws 281-283.
79 See Act of Apr. 5, 1904, ch. 230, 1904iN.J. Laws 400-404,
80 Sec Act ofJune 5, 1905, 1905 Fla. Laws ch. 5425, §§ 106-108.
al Sec Act of May 4, 1905, No. 92, 1905 Mich. Pub. Acts 130-132.
" See INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENC. & WALES, supra note 70; INST, OF
CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF SCOT., supra note 69; sec also INST. or CHARTERED
coort . rimrs 114 ENC. & WALES, Royal Charter of the 11th May 1880 [hereinafter Royal Charter],
available at littp://www.icnew.co.uk/index.cfm?AUB=TB2L29914,MNXI29914  (last vis-
ited Oct. 1, 2004). Of note, the 1CAEW's 1880 Royal Charter also prohibits FCAs from
splitting fees with persons in other professions, including fees in the form of commissions,
which anticipates similar prohibitions coming into effect much later in the U.S. profession.
Sec Royal Charter; supra.
"CAREY, Sit 	 note 23, at 20 (quoting SIR HAROLD HOWITF, THE HISTORY OF 'nit: IN-
STITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1966)). In fact, the
ICAEW's Royal Charter was premised explicitly on the hope that such a charter would
bring "public recognition of the importance of the profession and would tend to gradually
raise its character." Royal Charter, supra note 82.
754	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 45:741
ing numbers of both well-intentioned, and not so well-intentioned,
untrained persons who held theMselves out as public accountants to
satisfy the booming demand for accounting services.84
As substantial amounts of British capital began to flow to the
United States to finance the latter's industrialization, the now well-
respected Scottish and British chartered accountants followed to
monitor the capital owners' investments.89
 These British capital own-
ers seemed reluctant to hire U.S. accountants8—even though one
would guess that travel expenses alone would have driven up the cost
of British and Scottish accountant's over their American counterparts.
This was possibly a further demonstration of the power of the accredi-
tation that came with royal charters. 87
 A further insult to American
accountants was that even American businesses favored British and
Scottish accountants. 88
 At the sane time, a number of the chartered
accountants from the United Kingdom wound up staying in the
United States permanently and helped to establish some of the largest
firms there, including some firms that continue to exist today. 89
The practice of most U.S.-trained public accountants towards the
end of the nineteenth century was similar to that of U.K. accountants
before industrialization, chartering, and the passage of the Joint Stock
Companies Act of 1844. They helped businesses and individuals keep
a proper set of books, generated financial statements for the client's
internal use, and audited their books and inventories to guard against
embezzling managers and subordinates. 90
 This was pure "public ac-
counting," in which services were provided solely for the benefit of
paying clients.91
 Duties and liabilities ran primarily to the client and
consisted mainly of a duty to the client, and express third-party
beneficiaries, to perform accounting services "with the care and cau-
84 See LITTLETON, supra note 22, at 282-84.
e4 Sce CAREY, supra note 23, at 21-22, 27-28.
26 See id. at 21-22, 27, 33-34.
87
 This reluctance to hire U.S. accountants was especially pronounced in the period
before U.S. state CPA laws came into effect.
BB SCC CAREY, supra note 23, at 26-28, 34.•
88
 PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, for example, was established by British chartered ac-
countants in the United States. See id. at 27-28.
80 See id. at 25-26.
91
 The discussion in these paragraphs does not encompass the imminent arrival of the
expanded use of audited statements for the benefit of creditors and other third parties,
which will be discussed below. See infra notes!326-338 and accompanying text.
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Lion proper to their calling."92 There was expressly no notion or duty
pertaining to a "public calling" or obligations on behalf of the general
public: "public accountants are public only in the sense that their
services are offered to any one who chooses to employ them. This is
far from saying that those who do not employ them are in the same
position as those who do. "93
Further, the new state CPA laws added no obligations to the gen-
eral public.94 Instead, state laws simply limited use of the designation
"C.P.A." and similar "words, letters or figures" to individuals who met
the state's professional criteria. 95 Nonetheless, the CPA laws generally
were welcomed by the American profession. 96 In part, the laws
seemed to be an acknowledgment of the "arrival" of accounting as an
important profession, in the same league as law and medicine. 97 The
accountant's embrace of state laws also was influenced partially by the
profession's own initiatives to gain credibility and stature. 98 In New
York, the State Legislature and the Regents of the University of the
State of New York apparently did not think that the unregulated prac-
tice of public accounting was of itself as important or dangerous as,
say, medicine. Indeed, they opted for a law that set out requirements
only for those holding themselves out as "certified public account-
ants" (or other "expert" designations), instead of a law regulating all
public accountants. 99 The other states who were early adopters of CPA
laws also followed this model."' Of course, these states may simply
have been following the chartered accountant model from Great Brit-
ain. In the U.K. system, there was no general regulation of "account-
ants," but instead only a royal charter that gave the chartered socie-
ties, such as the ICAEW, the sole power to grant specific titles variant
on the theme of "chartered accountant."
92 See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441,444 (NA; 1931). This case also con-
templates a duty not to defraud any foreseeable users of the accountant's audit certificates,
as will be discussed below. Sec i ulna notes 311-444 and accompanying text.
95 See Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 448,
94 Sec supra notes 73-81.
95 See, e.g., supra note 73.
96 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 43-45.
97 Sec Marlowe, 203 N.Y.& at 479.
as In fact, other accountants, along with the precursor of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (the "AICPA"), had pushed for legislation recognizing the
profession as early as 1894. See CAREY, supra note 23, at 43-44. This is not surprising given
the effect that chartering seems to have liad on the prestige of their British and Scottish
counterparts.
99 Marlowe, 203 N.YS. at 477; CAREY, supra note 17, at 43-44.
IN See supra notes 74-81.
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The development of this sort of accredited profession-within-a-
profession in the United States, however, led to challenges as to the
authority of states to qualify CPAs—in particular, when the state rules
conflicted with or overruled a "certification" granted by a non-
governmental entity." These states ran up against private organiza-
tions purporting to grant the "degree" of certified public accountant,
and the concomitant claim that successful candidates of these pro-
grams should be allowed to use the "CPA" designation regardless of
state law on the matter."2
 In 1923, in People v. Marlowe, a New York
court rejected these claims as precluded by the state's police and wel-
fare powers. 103
 Further, the court was quick to point out that the legis-
lature was not regulating all of public accounting, but rather provid-
ing a particular way for highly qualified accountants to claim a meas-
urable level of expertise)" The new accreditation also raised
questions as to the various legislatures' choice of the term "certified
public accountant." One noted accounting historian has suggested
that a variation on "chartered accountant" was considered, but re-
jected on the grounds that it might conflict with the rights of the
chartered accountants from the British Isles—who continued to have
a strong presence in the United States. Additionally, the American
accountants themselves did not want to seem to be aping their British
and Scottish counterparts. 06
B. Development of the Modern Corporate Audit in Britain.
The foregoing model of pure public accounting, of course, is
oversimplified in one regard—it does not include the audit function
that would become a cornerstone of the modern CPA practice." 6
un In the United Kingdom, this problem likely was blunted or was eliminated simply
because of the broader power of the Crown.
102
 See, e.g., lifarlowe, 203 N.Y.S. at 475-76.
105 Id. at 476-77. Legislation was in the public interest and for the general welfare" in
order to "regulate the highly skilled and technical profession of public [accounting]." Id.
104
	 id. at 477. Perhaps this was yet another reason for adopting a limited accredita-
tion model in the United States, rather than a strict regulation of all accountants.
105 See CAR EY, supra note 23, at 44-45. John L. Carey further notes that the title "public
accountant" was so well established by individual accountants and in the names of profes-
sional associations, that "the simple addition of the prefix 'certified' seemed to meet with
general approval." Id. at 45. But perhaps state legislatures preferred it because it was more
accurate; they were establishing criteria to certify accounting professionals much as they
provided for certification of other professionals, such as doctors and lawyers. There was
simply no "charter" or "chartering" involved.
1D6 Sec UTELETON, supra note 22, at 259 (stating that "[Ole of the elements of ac-
counting which definitely distinguishes it from bookkeeping is auditing").
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That is in part because the audit function that is now well established
evolved through some unexpected twists and turns that will provide
the narrative for the rest of this Article. The contemporary notion of
an audit as an examination of financial books and records by a profes-
sional accountant is only one specific instance of the larger context in
which the term and concept originated. In one limited and technical
sense, "auditing"—as simply a process of checking financial records
for errors—may be traced all the way back to Fra Luca Pacioli in the
fifteenth century.'" The tradition that leads to our contemporary
audit, however, is not actually that of the accountant or bookkeeper
per se. Instead, it dates back to the practice commencing in thir-
teenth century Great Britain wherein regular members of a commu-
nity or enterprise were charged by their fellows to act as "awdytours"
to "verify the honesty of persons charged with fiscal, rather than
managerial, responsibilities."'" Such persons to be audited included
bo ut government and private enterprise officials.'"
This audit process also found a natural home in the manors of
England from the fourteenth century onward, where the auditor
would have been the most trusted member of the household staff 11 °
The auditor would "hear the accounts" presented by all his or her fel-
low servants in the manor who were charged with control of money or
property, Accordingly, the auditor had substantial power, including a
role in legal proceedings brought against unfaithful servants."' All of
m7
	 id. For background on Fra Luca Pacioli and his contributions, see supra note 16.
In Sec LrrrLE•roN, supra note 22, at 260-61. For example, beginning in 1310, "'six
good men of the city, elected in the presence of the whole commonalty - were to audit the
chamberlain of the City of London. Id.
11/9 See id.
110 Sec id. at 261-62. The auditor's importance in the manor is reflected in the follow-
ing statement:
"The auditor being the taste of all officers, is to bee judge betwixte the lorde
and his accomptams, and to deale milk for and beetweeu all parties, and
upon the determination of his audite, to presente to his lorde by booke or
breviate, all his receipts, expenses, itnprestes; whatsoever, with the remaines
of Inouye, if any bee."
Id. (quoting an unsigned statement written in 1605). Further, an early fourteenth century
book on estate management advised that "'Wile auditors ought to be faithful and pru-
dent.'" M at 262 (quoting Walter of Henley, HUSBANDRY).
III Sec id. at 262 ("(A] statute of Edward 1 in 1285 ... provided that servants found 'in
arrearages upon the account could be sent to prison by the testimony of the auditor.'").
This early practice of literally "hearing the accounts" was based on the limited ability to
read and write among the general population and led to the use of the term "auditor" in
the first place. See id.
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these early audits were premised on an earlier bookkeeping method
of "charge and discharge," which simply tracked money and property
"charged" to a servant as that servant "discharged" them through the
intended disposition of the master. 112
 The audits themselves were not
necessarily viewed as accounting or bookkeeping exercises. Early ex-
amples of proto-audit certificates included statements in audit reports
for the City of Aberdeen from 1586 through 1587, which noted that
the accounts had been "'Heard, seen, considerit, calculat, and allowit
by the auditors,' and 'futit, calculat and endit by Auditors.' "" 3
One noted accounting historian summed up these early audits as
falling into two general categories: (1) "more or less public hearing[s]
of the results of the fiscal activities of governmental officers by dele-
gated representatives of the citizens[,)" and (2) "careful scrutiny by a
trusted officer of the manor of the 'charge and discharge' accounts of
those household officers who had fiscal responsibilities." The com-
mon theme, of course, was the delegated authority by those who had
valuable interests in certain assets to a trusted agent, working solely
on their behalf. This person was to check up on the use of those assets
by other agents who had been charged with their disposition. In stan-
dard agency law terms, a principal would authorize one agent to in-
vestigate the activities of another agent. Under standard common law
agency principles, both agents had clear, enforceable fiduciary duties
running to the principal." 6
Put into the foregoing context, then, it is not surprising that a
"statutory audit" was included in both the Joint Stock Companies Act
of 1844 and the 1845 Companies Clauses Act." 6
 Further, both statutes
required that the shareholders appoint at least one of the auditors. 1 17
There was also no requirement that auditors .be accountants,"8 again
harkening back to the origins of the audit provision in the older Eng-
112
 See Edwards, supra note 27, at 32-33.
113 LrI1LETON, supra note 22, at 263. "Futit" signified "footed," as in the modern prac-
tice of referring to tabulations as "footings."
1 " Id. at 263-64.
"5
 See WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP §§ 65-74 (3d ed.
2001) (explaining the duties of agents).
116
 This connection between feudal audits and the statutory audit provisions is sug-
gested by A.C. Littleton. Sec LinturoN, supra note 22, at 288-90.
112
 The rule in the joint Stock Companies Act of 1844. Sew 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110, § 38
(Eng.). The 1845 Companies Clauses Act further specifies that such auditors must hold at
least one share in the company, but otherwise they must have no other interest in it (for
example, as officers or directors). Sec 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, § 102 (Eng.).
118 See Companies Clauses Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Viet., c. 16, § 102: Joint Stock Companies
Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110, § 38.
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lisle auditor custom of municipalities and manor houses. The 1845
Companies Clauses Act, however, specifically authorized the elected
auditors to hire professional accountants, if they desired, and to
charge the expense to the company. 119
On this last point, some confusion enters the accounting history
literature. A.C. Littleton, in his early seminal history of accounting,
placed the two parliamentary acts in sequence, with one amending
the other, rather than realizing that they represent two distinct linea-
ges of legislation (and subject niatter)• 120 John L. Carey also commit.-
ted and amplified this error in his later, and equally renowned, his-
tory of the American accounting profession, by collapsing the two
statutes into one that lie dated to 1845. 121 A.C. Littleton also asserted
an "evolution" of auditor qualifications in what he seemed to believe
was a direct lineage of parliamentary acts even beyond the Joint Stock
Companies Act of 1844 and 1845 Companies Clauses Act:
Under the act of 1845 every auditor "shall have at least one
share" and may employ an accountant to assist (Sec. 102);
under the act of 1862 the auditors "may be members of the
company" and may employ accountants to assist (table A,
Sec. 86); under the companies act of 1908 no qualification
in regard to stock holding by the auditor was mentioned and
the item about employing an accountant to assist was omit-
ted. (Sec. 112). 122
It seems that A.C. Littleton is suggesting that the evolution was from
traditional English "auditors," who might employ accountants, to pro-
fessional accountants, who are directly appointed as the sort of audi-
tors we think of today. There also seems to be an inference that the
audit role was generalized and weakened over time. It changed from
one that primarily empowered shareholders to examine management
reports, to one that simply had professional accountant/auditors cer-
"9 See 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, § 108.
120 1,1711,11'0N, supra note 22, at 289 MUM') a few months [the Joint Stock Compa-
nies Act of 1844j was revised and repassed as 'the companies clauses consolidation act' of
1845.").
121 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 17. John L. Carey's debt to, and reliance on, A.C.
Littleton is acknowledged clearly at the outset of the chapter in which the error occurs. Id.
at 13.
122 LtrrizroN, supra note 22, at 293 (alteration in original) (quoting in unnumbered
footnote Company Clauses Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, § 102; The Companies Act, 1862,
25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, tbLA, § 86 (Eng.); and The Companies Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 12, § 112
(Eng.) respectively).
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tifying company financial statements for the unfocused benefit of the
entire investing public. 123
In fact, no such evolution occurred. Instead, the passage of the
1845 Companies Clauses Act had no effect on the Joint Stock Com-
panies Act of 1844. 124 Thus, the free incorporation lineage of compa-
nies statutes began with no requirement for auditors to be sharehold-
ers, nor was there an explicit provision for auditors to hire account-
ants. 125 The only real requirement was that at least one auditor must.
be appointed by the shareholders directly. 126
 Of note for later discus-
sion, though, the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 also provided
that a government agency, the Commissioners of the Treasury; was
empowered to set the auditor's salary, as "appear[ed] suitable" to the
Commissioners and that such salary was legally enforceable against
the company. 127 Additionally, the auditor's report on management's
mandatory half-yearly presentation of the company's accounts and
balance sheet had to be sent with the latter materials to the govern-
ment Registrar of Joint Stock Companies. The auditor's report also
needed to be available for public inspection at the Registry Office. 128
Aside from the auditor's reports, however, which were made available
either directly from the company or through the Registry Office,
shareholders had only a qualified right to inspect the company's
books. Further, the company had discretion to mandate the terms of
any inspection . 129
The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 was amended and re-
pealedl" over tune through different acts, some of which themselves
123 This was more clearly the American system that was taking shape just as A.C.
Littleton published his book in 1933, but it ignored the historical and cultural context of
British audits that A.C. Littleton himself worked so hard to establish. See generally
LrITLETON, supra note 22.
124 Sec Companies Clauses Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16 (lacking any mention of repeal
or amendment of Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844, as was the custom of other repealing
or amending acts in the same era).
125 See joint Stock Companies Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110, § 38 (Eng.).
126 Id.
127 Id.
in Id. § 43.
129 See id. at § 37. The 1845 Companies Clauses Act has a similar limited right of in-
spection by shareholders, and further, does not provide for an outside government Regis-
try Office. Of course, a Registry Office is less relevant for statutory companies: because
they can only be created by a Parliamentary act, the government is already fully aware of
each one that comes into existence. See 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, §§ 117, 119.
130 The amendment and repeal of the joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 excepted ex-
isting companies registered under it, until they reregistered under the subsequent acts, as
well as existing and to be formed insurance companies. Sec infra note 133.
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were amended and repealed. 131 First, it was amended in 1847, 132 and
then it was repealed by the Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856 (the "1856
Act"). 133 The new law added a right for one-fifth of shareholders, in
number and value, to request that the government. Board of Trade ap-
point inspectors to examine the affairs of the company, 134 which seems
to indicate a concern to give substantial, yet minority, subsets of share-
holders another avenue to investigate the company beyond the existing
audit rights. It also included, however, a provision for companies to ap-
point their own inspectors to investigate the company's affairs, in a
manner similar to that used to request Board of Trade inspectors. 135
The resulting separate inspection performed by these inspectors seems
to have replaced the limited direct shareholder inspection rights of the
previous statute, because the only direct inspection right. in the 1856
Act is one reasonably limited by the company and solely for purposes of
inspecting the "Register of Shareholders"—not the general books of
the company. 136 Both new inspector provisions, however, required
management to produce all books and documents requested by the
inspectors, as well as to answer any question, under oath, posed by the
inspectors on pain of penalties and fines. 137
The 1856 Act also established default audit provisions that were
strengthened in comparison to the original Joint Stock Companies
Act of 1844. Auditors were not expressly required to be shareholders,
but at the same time, auditors could not be interested in any transac-
tion of the company in any manner other than as a shareholder. 138
191 Some amendments were directed only toward the winding-up provisions of the law
and will not be recounted here.
"2 Act to Amend [the joint Stock Companies Act of 1844], 10 & 11 Vict., c. 78 (1847)
(Eng.). This amending statute did not alter the audit provisions of the joint Stock Compa-
nies Act of 1844.
"2 19 & 20 Vict., c. 47 (Eng.). The joint Stock Companies Act, 1856 also repealed the
1847 amendment. See Act to Amend the joint Stock Companies Acts, 1856 and 1857, 21 &
22 Vict., c. 60 (1858) (Eng.); [Second] Act to Amend the Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856,
20 & 21 Vict., c. 80 (1857) (Eng.); Act to Amend the Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856, 20
& 21 Vict., c. 14 (1857) (Eng.).
184 SeeJoint Stock Companies Act, 1856,19 Re 20 Vict., c. 47, § 48.
195 See id. at § 51.
196 See id. at § 23. Similarly, companies now were required only to register initially with
the Registry Office and then to submit annual "Register of Shareholders," but not the
balance sheets and reports of the company. See id. at § 17. This is possibly because the
specific accounts and reports required in the body of the 1844 statute were now arguably
"optional," depending simply on the regulations that the company had adopted, as dis-
cussed below. See infra notes 144-146 and accompanying text.
"7 See id. at §§ 49, 51.
198 Sec id. at tbl.B,	 76.
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Officers and directors were ineligible to be auditors while they re-
mained in those offices.'" The company had first rights to set the
compensation of the attditors. 140 Auditors explicitly were permitted to
hire accountants at the expense of the company (in line with the 1845
Companies Clauses Act)," and had express powers to "examine"
officers and directors."2
 Of particular note, the 1856 Act also
specifically set forth what be thought of as the core definition of the
modern professional audit:
The auditors shall make a Report to the Shareholders upon
the Balance Sheet and Accounts, and in every such Report
they shall state whether, in their Opinion, the Balance Sheet
is a full and fair Balance Sheet, containing the Particulars
required by these Regulations, and properly drawn up so as
to exhibit a true and correct View of the State of the Com-
pany's Affairs, and in case they have called for Explanations
or Information from the Directors, whether such Explana-
tions or Information have been given by the Directors, and
whether they have been satisfactory; and such Report shall
be read, together with the Report of the Directors, at the
Ordinary Meeting. 143
Companies were free, however, to adopt modified versions of any of
the default "Regulations for Management of the Company" included
as Table B of the 1856 Act. 144
 If they adopted no regulations, then the
default rules were considered binding on the company. 146
 It is unclear
whether a company could adopt regulations that completely ignored
specific provisions of the default rules—for example, the audit provi-
sions—or regulations that represented such watered-down provisions
as to vitiate any practical import. Further, a company's regulations al-
ways could be modified by special resolution of the shareholders, 146
and the belief may have been that shareholders who wanted audit
provisions in place would get them through a special resolution if
they were not already part of the company's regulations.
139
	 Stock Companies Act, 1856. 19 & 20 Vict., c. 47, tbl,B, I 76.
140 See id. at tbl.B, 11 78, 81.
' 4 ' See id. at tb1.11, 1 83
"2 See id.
143 Id. at tb1.B, I 84.
144
 SeeJoint Stock Companies Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47, § 9.
140 Sec id.
148 Sec id. at §§ 33-36.
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The following year, the 1856 Act was amended first by The Joint
Stock Companies Act, 1857, 147 and then further by An Act to Amend
"The Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856." 148 Neither one of these
amendments modified the existing audit provisions. 149 The 1856 Act
was later amended once more, 150 with no changes to the audit provi-
sions, before itself being repealed in 1862. 151
The Companies Act, 1862 (the "1862 Act") repealed the Joint.
Stock Companies Act, 1856, and its progeny. 152 It also repealed or
amended a number of other statutes, effectively bringing together all
of the laws governing both regular "trading" joint stock companies
and banking companies, the only exceptions being charter and statu-
tory companies. In dropping the "joint" part of the previous statute
names, it also signified a move towards the modern use of the un-
modified term "company" to include joint, fixed stock firms. The
statute preserved the right of shareholders to request an examination
of the affairs of the company by inspectors from the Board of Trade,
or by their own inspectors.'" lt, also retained the provisions for a
"Register of Members" 154 which had to be available to shareholders at.
the company's office and submitted to the government Registry
Office for inspection by the general public. 155 Further, shareholders
still could amend the regulations of the company by special resolu-
tion. 156
The default audit provisions of the Joint Stock Companies Act,
1856, persisted as well, with minor alterations. Auditors now were
charged expressly with performing an audit once a year' 57 and the
company was to set compensation at-large in general meeting.'" The
1862 Act also provided an interesting first suggestion of an "audit
147 20 & 21 Viet., c. 14 (Eng.).
148 20 & 21 Vict., c. 80 (1857) (Eng.).
149 As a side note, the original Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 remained in force
throughout this period for companies that had been formed under it before repeal, as well
as for insurance companies either existing or to be formed. Sec id. at § 1.
150 Scene Joint Stock Companies Amendment Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., c. 60 (Eng.).
151 See The Companies Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89 (Eng.).
152 See id. at § 4, sched. 3, pt. 1. This Schedule provides an excellent listing of the prior
acts amended or repealed by The Companies Act, 1862. Insurance companies were also
required to register tinder and in accordance with the provisions of this law. See id. at § 209.
153 See id. at §§ 56-60.
154 In the various companies acts, there is a certain interchangeability of the terms
"member" and "shareholder."
"5 See id. at §§ 25-26, 32.
158 See id. at §§ 50-51, 53-54.
157 See The Companies Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict,, c. 89, sched. 1,11 83-94.
158 See id.
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committee"—although of course not composed of directors or officers,
nor a committee of the board of directors—in a model "Memorandum
of Association" given as an attachment to the statute. 139
 This memoran-
dum suggested that the audit committee normally would be nominated
by the members—that is, shareholders—of the company at the annual
meeting, and have all the powers of the auditors tinder the statute.'"
There followed a long succession of amending acts, few of which
had a substantial effect on the audit provisions that were now well es-
tablished for stock companies. 1 ° 1
 Much of this amending history was
based on attempts to limit the "illegitimate or fraudulent practices on
the part of unscrupulous persons" who exploited the limited liability
system introduced by the 1862 Act. 162
 At the same time, it was claimed
to be "obvious to everyone of what value and importance the limited
liability system has been and is to the commercial prosperity of the
country." 1 °3
 Indeed, by 1907, there were 40,000 companies operating
under the various free incorporation companies acts with a total of
£2,000,000,000 invested in them.'" Thus, the number of free incor-
poration companies already far outstripped the numbers of either
charter companies or statute companies. Accordingly, the free incor-
poration system encompassed the lion's share of incorporated busi-
159
 Sec id. at § 29, sched. 2, frm. B.
if'.° See id. at §§ 29-34, sched. 2, frm. B.
161
 Other acts were passed to amend The Companies Act, 1862, directly; but they are of
limited relevance here otherwise. See The Companies Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, C. 12 (Eng.)
(permitting companies incorporated in British possessions to own land); The Companies
Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 26 (Eng.) (empowering courts to enforce various provisions of
the collected companies acts); The Companies (Winding up) Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c.
58 (Eng.) (amending further winding up procedures); The Companies (Winding up) Act,
1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 63 (Eng.) (specifying winding up procedures); The Companies
(Memorandum of Association) Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 62 (Eng.) (allowing companies
to modify their memorandum of association, or other incorporating document, by special
resolution); The Companies Act, 1886, 49 Vict.
, c. 23 (Eng.) (providing for liquidation
procedures for companies in Scotland); The Companies (Colonial Registers) Act, 1883, 46
& 47 Vict., c. 30 (Eng.) (permitting companies incorporated in British colonies to keep
local registers of members); The Companies Act, 1880, 43 Vict.. c. 19 (Eng.) (permitting
distributions of accumulated capital to shareholders on certain conditions and establishing
power of the Registrar of Companies to remove names of defunct companies from the
Registry); The Companies Act, 1877, 40 & 41 Vict., c. 26 (Eng.) (clarifying that "capital"
includes "paid up capital" and that companies can reduce the same); The Joint Stock
Companies Arrangements Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 104 (Eng.) (specifying conditions on
winding up arrangements between creditors and shareholders); An Act to Amend The
Companies Act, 1862, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 47 (1867) (Eng.) (later known . as "The Companies
Act, 1867") (simplifying settlement of company debts to the Crown).162 2 Curny's STATtrrts or PRACTICAL. UTILI'lY 531 n.(q) (W.H. Aggs ed., 6th ed. 1911).
163
164 Id. (citing Lord Granard, [louse of Lords (Mar. 14, 1907)).
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ness enterprise in England and could not be disassembled practically
at that late date.
A few amendments of The Companies Act, 1862, are worth not-
ing, however. The Companies Act, 1879,165 removed any ambiguity
about requirements for both auditors and an annual audit, at least for
banking companies, by adopting the now standard audit provisions of
the default regulations of previous acts. 166 The 1879 Act also instituted
a new requirement—again only for banking companies—that the bal-
ance sheets submitted to shareholders as part of the annual, or other,
meetings be signed by the auditors, as well as the directors of the
company. 167
A clear precursor to the liabilities, and defenses, of company di-
rectors pursuant to untrue statements made in stock prospectuses that
appear in the '33 Act was set out in the Directors Liability Act, 1890. 168
Of note here, is the provision that allowed directors to defend such
claims based on good faith reliance on the expert reports of others,
such as accountants. 169
The turn of the century brought a major change regarding audits
and auditors to the Companies Acts, 1862 to 1898, 170 in the form of
the Companies Act, 1900 (the "1900 Act."). 171 The new law removed
the ambiguity about audits brought on by the placement of the rele-
' 63 42 & 43 N'ict., c. 76 (Eng.).
166 See id. at § 7.
167 See id. at § 8. Note that this is different from requiring auditors to sign their own re-
ports.
168 53 & 54 Vict., c. 64 (Eng.).
165
 Id. at § 3(1) (b). This prescient provision reads as follows:
With respect to every such untrue statement purporting to be a statement by
or contained in what purports to be a copy of or extract from a report or
valuation of an engineer, valuer, accountant, or other expert, that it fairly
represented the statement made by such engineer, valuer, accountant, or
other expert, or was a correct and fair copy of or extract from the report or
valuation. Provided always, that notwithstanding that such untrue statement
fairly represented the statement made by such an engineer, valuer, account-
ant, or other expert, or was a correct and fair copy of an extract from the re-
port or valuation, such director, person named, promoter, or other person,
who authorised the issue of the prospectus or notice as aforesaid, shall be li-
able to pay compensation as aforesaid if it be proved that he had no reason-
able ground to believe that the person making the statement, report, or
valuation was competent to make it ....
Id.
170 This is the convention set out in the various amending acts themselves. See, e.g.,
Companies Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict„ c. 48, § 36 (Eng.).
" 1 63 & 64 Vict., c. 48.
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vant provisions in the "optional" default regulations of Table B in the
1862 Act, by reinserting them in the body of the new statute. 172 This
development extended the trend of requiring audits, which started in
the Companies Act, 1879, for banking companies, to all companies
covered by the Companies Acts, 1862 to 1898.
Of note, these audit provisions continued the practice of the "op-
tional" default audit provisions of earlier acts in which the only
qualification for auditors was that they could not also serve as officers
or directors of the company.'" Remuneration and appointment of
auditors remained generally the sole province of the company acting in
general meeting—that is, full shareholder participation and voting." 4
The auditors continued to have rights of access at all times to the
books, accounts, and vouchers of the company, as well as the right to
require information and explanations from directors and officers. 05
Their mock of reporting was altered, however, because aside from the
regular reports on the accounts examined, the auditors were to "sign a
certificate at the foot of the balance sheet stating whether or not all
their requirements as auditors have been complied with." 176
more references to auditors began appearing in other parts of the sec-
tions of the Companies Acts, 1862 to 1898, including those in the 1900
Act, suggesting an expanding formal role for auditors. In particular, the
1900 Act included a provision mandating that prospectuses include the
names and addresses of the company's auditors, 177
 and that the report
from the initial "statutory meeting" of the company contain a capitali-
zation section certified as correct by the auditors. 178
One final relevant amending act rounds out the history of the
Companies Acts, 1862 to 1900—the Companies Act, 1907 (the "1907
Act"). 179
 The new law primarily concerned the issuances of prospec-
tuses, and included a requirement that a prescribed "Statement in
Lieu of Prospectus" be filed with the Registrar of Companies if no
172 See id. at §§ 21-23.
175
 See id. at § 21(3). That is, of course, auditors could only serve as officers of the
company by virtue of being auditors; they could not occupy other officer positions.
174 See id. at § 21. The directors can appoint the initial auditors and fill any casual va-
cancies. In addition, they can set remuneration in the foregoing situations.
175
 See id. at § 23.
175
 63 & 64 Vict., c. 48, § 23.
"7 See id. at § 10(1)(i).
175 See id. at § 12(3). The "statutory meeting" appears akin to the organizational meet-
ing required of most new corporations in U.S. state corporation laws.
175 7 Edw. 7, c. 50, §§ 1-52 (Eng.).
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prospectus was used in connection with the sale of stock. 188 The 1907
Act also included a revision of the now mandatory audit provisions of
the 1900 Act. In particular, the audit section was revised to require
that (1) either the auditor's report be directly attached to any balance
sheet submitted to the shareholders in general meeting, or a refer-
ence to the report must be included at the foot of the balance sheet;
(2) the auditor's report had to be read before the company in general
meeting and to be open to inspection by any shareholder, including a
right to copies for nominal charge; (3) anyone, other than a retiring
auditor, who was to be nominated for appointment as auditor at the
general meeting must be nominated by a shareholder who discloses
such intention to nominate the individual a prescribed period before
the meeting; and, (4) when any copies of balance sheets were issued,
circulated, or published without being signed by the directors and
including the auditor's report or reference thereto, the persons re-
sponsible for such act could be fined up to fifty pounds, 181
The new law also required companies that had to submit annual
reports to the Registry Office with summaries of financial activities
under the Companies Acts, 1862 to 1900, to include a balance sheet
audited by the company's auditors. 182 This clearly anticipated the later
annual statutory audit required under rules promulgated by the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") under the '34 Act. It
also represented an interesting step forward in the British system for
auditor's reports possibly to be used, and to be relied on, by persons
other than management and shareholders of the company.
When the accretion of amending statute upon statute had be-
come too labyrinthian, however, Parliament once again repealed the
whole lot and replaced it with the Companies (Consolidation) Act,
1908. 183 This Act preserved the two important protections of inspec-
tion by the Board of Trade on request of a subset of shareholders 18.1
and annual audits by auditors who could not be officers or directors
of the company, and who must be appointed by the company-at-large
in the annual meeting. 185 Auditors retained their powers of access to
18° See id. at §§ 1-3.
181 See id. at § 19.
162 See id. at § 2L
183 8 Edw. 7, c. 69, §§ 1-296 (Eng.).
164 See id. at § 109.
lea See id. at §§ 112-113.
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documents and management and their rights to issue reports accessi-
ble to shareholders.'"
Further, the requirements to file an annual register of members,
as well as an audited balance sheet, with the Registry Office continued
in force. 157
 The register also had to be kept at the registered office of
the company and had to be made available for inspection by both
shareholders (gratis) and the general public (for no more than one
shilling). 158
 Copies of the annual report and the register needed to be
made available on request by either shareholders or members of the
public for no more than sixpence per hundred words.'"
The company and its officers could incur liability for not making
the register and annual report available pursuant to the foregoing
requirements,'" but it is not clear whether the audited balance sheet
was "relied on" by members of the public enough to create any liabil-
ity issues for the auditors. A provision of the Companies (Consolida-
tion) Act, 1908, however, established liability in certain instances:
[When] any person in any return, report, certificate, balance
sheet, or other document, required by or for the purpose of
any of the provisions of this Act specified in the Fifth Sched-
ule hereto, wilfully [sic] makes a statement false in any mate-
rial particular, knowing it to be false, he shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor ... . 191
Finally, this lineage of companies acts metamorphosed through
one more set of amendments before again being repealed and recon-
solidated into the Companies Act, 1929, which would, in turn, be the
direct template for the '33 Act in the United States. 192
 In particular, the
Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, would be amended by the
Companies Act, 1913; 193
 the Companies (Particulars as to Directors)
Act, 1917; 191
 and the Companies Act, 1928 (the "1928 Act"). 195 The last.
of these, however, would never become effective because the Compa-
nies Act, 1929, was passed before many of the 1928 Act's provisions
188 Id. at § 113,11 1-4.
187 See id. at § 26, 1 3.
188 See Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 69, § 30,1 1 (Eng.).
189
 See id.	 § 30, 1 2.
190 See id. at § 26, 1 5 Sc § 30, 1 3.
'9 ' Id. at § 281.
197 See infra notes 311-444 and accompanying text.
193 3 & 4 Geo. 5, c. 25 (Eng.).
194 7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 28 (Eng.).
'0
 18 Se 19 Geo. 5, c. 45 (Eng.).
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were implemented; therefore, rrinch of 1928 Act was either repealed or
restated in the Companies Act, 1929. 190
For the purposes of this Article, though, it is only the new material
included in the final consolidation of the 1928 Act and the Companies
Act, 1929, that advances the audit story in a curious way. Of central im-
portance for this story, and with little explanation, the Companies Act,
1929, brought into force a new provision of the 1928 Act that required
an auditor's report on the profits of the company for the preceding
three years to be part of any prospectus used to sell stock. 197 This report
also would set out the rates of dividends, if any, paid on each class of
shares in each of the three years covered.I 98 Additionally, where any
proceeds of the securities offering would be used to purchase another
business, a report by accountants—to be named in the prospectus—
covering the profits of that business for the preceding three years also
had to be included. 199 This unassuming change to a schedule to the
1928 Act furthered the new trend for British company audits to be
used, and relied on, by others outside of the company's management
and shareholders.
Aside from this new audit requirement for prospectuses, though,
the Companies Act, 1929, did not add much to the story. Directors and
other officers, in certain circumstances, could still rely on accountant's
reports in liability actions based on untrue statements in prospec-
tuses. 200 The register of members was no longer required to be submit-
ted annually to the Registry Office, but it had to be indexed and up-
dated and available to a prescribed minimum extent to shareholders
and members of the public at the company's registered office. 201
annual return, however, was still required to be filed with the Registry
Office, as well as made available by the company in the same manner as
the register. 202 This return also had to include a list of shareholders as
well as the last audited balance sheet, together with its auditor's re-
106 See 26 CHEITY'S STATUTES OF PRACTICAI, UTILITY 553 (Theodore John Sophian
ed., 1929).
197 See Companies Act, 1929,19 & 20 Geo. 5. c. 23, sched. IV, pt. II (Eng.). This provi-
sion was derived from the Companies Act, 1928. Sec 18 & 19 Geo. 5, c. 45, § 33. The gen-
eral provisions for the prospectuses themselves are set out at sections 34 through 38 of the
Companies Act, 1928. Id. §§ 33-38.
198 Sec Companies Act, 1929,19 Re 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, sched. IV, pt. II.
190 Sec id.
200 Sec id. § 37(1) (d). Accountants are "experts" per section 37(4). Id. § 37(4).
201 Sec id. §§ 97-98.
2O 2 See id. §§ 108-111.
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port. 205 Newly formed companies still had to hold a "statutory meeting"
and issue a "statutory report," certified by the company's auditors to
members, as well as file a copy of the report with the Registry Office. 204
Likewise, the standard auditor provisions were fully retained,205
except that the disqualifications as to eligibility to act as an auditor
were extended beyond officers and directors of the company to en-
compass (1) persons who are partners or employees of an officer of
the company and (2) any corporation. 206 There were also extra calls
for use of auditors' reports, such as in the case of holding and sub-
sidiary companies,207 and a requirement that auditors must disclose
the particulars of any case in which the accounts they had been exam-
ining were not kept in accordance with the provisions of the Act. 208 In
a new development, however, auditors were included expressly in a
provision limiting so-called "willful default" clauses that indemnify or
exempt directors and officers from liability that might otherwise at-
tach under the law—regardless of whether the auditors were consid-
ered officers of the company by virtue of their positions.209
Additionally, in the now well established manner, balance sheets
presented by management had to have auditor's reports attached, and
the auditor's reports needed to be read at the general meeting and
made available for inspection by shareholders."' Improperly executed
balance sheets, or balance sheets without auditor's reports, that were
distributed, continued to lead to liability for the knowing distribti-
tors. 211 The rights of members to receive balance sheets, and auditor's
reports attached thereto, however, were extended. For example, the
Act required auditors to send these materials to shareholders in ad-
vance of meetings and to furnish the same upon demand, even to
shareholders who might not otherwise have a right to them- 212
The provisions for inspectors from the Board of Trade were re-
tained, but were strengthened, including subsequent court actions
that may be premised on their findings. The provisions also were bal-
2" See Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, §§ 108, 110.
294
	 id. § 113.
202 See id. §§ 132-134.
2017 See ad.§ 133.
207 See id. § 126(2).
208 Sec Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 128(4).
209 See id. § 152. The auditor, as an officer, also might be subjected to the extra penal-
ties for officers acting in default of provisions of the Act. See id. § 365.
210 See	 § 129.
212 See id.
212 See id . § 130.
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anted by inquiry and security requirements of those calling for such
inspection to minimize bad faith requests. 2 " Similarly, companies re-
tained the ability to appoint their own inspectors by special resolu-
tion, with similar rights and obligations of those appointed by the
Board of Trade. 2"
In sum, the Companies Act, 1929, continued the established
framework for the audit and auditor requirements, while consolidat-
ing a trend of gradual, incremental expansion of audit report use.
The primary thrust of the system, however, was still to provide share-
holders an organized mechanism that they could control to monitor
directors' and officers' management of the company. Before turning
to summarize the overall state and context of auditors and audits in
the British system—up to that system's pronounced influence on the
drafting and passage of the '33 Act in the United States—it is impor-
tant to tie up some loose ends. This will be clone by briefly tracing the
less convoluted paths of audit provisions in the lineages of acts gov-
erning statutory companies and charter companies. 215
To begin, the Companies Clauses Act, 1845 (the "1845 Act"), gov-
erning statutory companies, is still valid Iaw.m It has been amended,
but not fully repealed. The Companies Clauses Act, 1863, was the first
amendment, but it mainly concerns modifications of the capitalization
provisions. 217 Next, the Companies Clauses Act, 1869, modified provi-
sions regarding debentures. 218 The amending acts were consolidated in
the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1888 (the "1888 Act"), 219
which led to the full law as to statutory companies distributed between
the original 1845 Act and the 1888 Act, all of which is cited as the
Companies Clauses Consolidation Acts, 1845 and 1888. 220 The 1888 Act.
itself only modifies provisions regarding proxy voting. Finally, the Statu-
tory Companies (Redeemable Stock) Act, 1915, permitted statutory
companies to authorize and to issue redeemable preference and de-
benture stock. 221 Accordingly, essentially all of the law regarding statu-
tory companies was set out among the Companies Clauses Act, 1845,
the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1888, and the Statutory
215 Sec Companies Act, 1929,19 & 20 Ceo. 5, c. 23, §§ 135-136.
214 See id. § 137,
215 Sec infm notes 216-236 and accompanying text.
216 See 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16 (Eng.); see also 8 HALS BURY'S STATUTES, .111PM note 52, at 8,
217 26 & 27 Vict., c. 118 (Eng.).
216 32 & 33 Vict., c. 48 (Eng.).
216 51 & 52 Vict., c. 48 (Eng.).
22° See id. § 1.
221 5 & 6 Ceo. 5, c. 44 (Eng.).
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Companies (Redeemable Stock) Act, 1915—especially when consider-
ing it at the time of passage of the '33 Act in the United States.
The audit and auditor provisions in this lineage were contained in
the 1845 Act, as discussed briefly above. These provisions may be
amended or disregarded, however, when the specific parliamentary act
that created the company did so expressly. Thus, to some extent, all of
the Companies Clauses Consolidated Acts, 1845 and 1888, are default
rules. 222
 To expand on the brief sketch of audit provisions above, the
following are the "default" requirements for statutory companies:
auditors must be elected by the shareholders in the same manner as
directors;223
 there must be two auditors unless the shareholders vote
otherwise;224
 auditors must hold at least one share in the company, but
they may not hold any other office in the company, nor have any other
interest in the company other than as a shareholder;225
 one auditor in
any given year must rotate out of office, but can be re-elected as a
"new" auditor immediately; 226
 auditors must receive and examine the
half-yearly reports of the directors; 227
 auditors may employ account-
ants at the expense of the company; 228
 and auditors can either make a
special report on their examination of the half-yearly directors' re-
ports, or simply confirm the directors' reports, with such report or
confirmation to be read at the general meeting. 229
Other important provisions not related specifically to audits or
auditors include the following: a "Shareholder Address Book" must be
kept and made available to shareholders, but not the general public,
in the same manner as the Register of Members for joint stock com-
panies;n° general meetings must be held half-yearly; 2" officers are
specifically liable to account for their use of company monies, with
specific penalties, including possible criminal charges, for non-
222 See 51 & 52 Viet., c. 48, § 1,
2" See Companies Clauses Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, § 101 (Eng.). This is more
specific than the "appointment of auditors" by "general meeting" in the Companies Acts.
22' See hi.
225 See id. § 102.
226 See id. § 103. Of course, this seems a little formalistic, with little practical safeguard-
ing benefit.
227 See id. § 107. And, the directors are obliged to deliver the same to them. See id. at
§ 106.
228 See 8 & 9 Viet., c. 16, § 108.
229 sca id.
2" See id. This is in addition to a Registry of Shareholders, but that registry is not re-
quired to be available to shareholders in the same manner. Sec id. at § 9.
281 See id. § 66.
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compliance;232 and accounts must be kept, and books balanced, with
shareholders given limited rights to see evidence of the same. 233
For chartered companies, the lineage of statutes is even briefer. ,
The original Chartered Companies Act, 1837, 234 was amended only by
the Chartered Companies Act, 1884,235 before both were repealed by
the Statute Law (Repeals) Act, 1993. 235 At the time of the '33 Act,
however, both were still in force. For our purposes, neither act is par-
ticularly instructive, as they say little about audits or auditors as dis-
cussed above.
* * *
It is clear that the audit custom and office in British companies
and law developed largely without formal reference to accountants,
chartered or otherwise. Instead, they were rooted in a centuries old
tradition of directly delegated agency to trusted individuals who would
look after their principals' interests as against other agents of those
principals. As explained below, the entire Companies Acts system was
admired enough by Congress and the drafters of the '33 Act (and '34
Act) to be followed closely. Much of what. was good in the Companies
Acts, however, may well have stemmed from a top-down coherency al-
lowed by the aggregation in one place of the law relating to corpora-
tions, securities regulation, and bankruptcy (insofar as related to rules
governing the winding up of companies). Further, to the extent that.
accountants were employed—directly or indirectly—as auditors, they
were also likely to be chartered accountants, who were themselves li-
censed, regulated, and associated professionally under one authority.
The real beauty of the British audit system, however, is that it. ex-
isted as a stand alone office of the company, beholden only to share-
holders as a watchdog for their interests. Audits were not done by a
company's auditors for the use of third parties, such as creditors. In-
stead, as outlined above, British creditors tended to employ their own
232
	 id. §§ 109-114. This sounds like the old "charge and discharge" system, but with
the directors acting as "auditors."
2 " SCC 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, §§ 115-119.
254 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 73 (Eng.).
235 47 & 48 Vict., c. 56 (Eng.) (granting power to Crown to renew terms of chartered
companies).
236 Statute Law (Repeals) Act, 1993, c. 50 (Eng.), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/
acts/acts1993/Ukpga_19930050_en_Lhtm (last visited Oct. 1, 2004); see also 8 HA ISBURY'S
STATuts, supra note 52, at 8. Even after the repeal of the Chartered Companies Act, 1837,
and the Chartered Companies Act, 1884, however, the Queen still retained the power to
grant charters of incorporation of limited duration and to extend or renew such charters,
or the privileges granted by such, a charter. Statute Law (Repeals) Act, 1993, c. 50, § 11,
sched. 2.
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auditors to check up on their investments at home or abroad. When a
company was being liquidated, the Board of Trade also could call for
an audit of the accounts of the liquidator, but there is no indication
that such audit would be clone by the company's auditor, nor that. any
reliance would be given on the company's auditors' reports or
certificates. 237 Most important, there was no sense that a company's
auditors were acting on behalf of the general public, or even on behalf
of that subset which might be deemed the "investing public." This was
because of the formal disconnect between the company office of "audi-
tor" and the separate profession of accountants, chartered or other-
wise. Thus, in the British system in place at the time of the passage of
the '33 Act, auditors occupied a unique position as quasi-insiders-
technically officers of the company—but also as elected agents or
watchdogs for the existing shareholders. The auditor's role was essen-
tially a "private" one, in that it was exclusively on behalf of the hiring
party, the shareholders.
Chartered accountants, however, who performed audit services
directly or indirectly as a company's auditors, might have felt a profes-
sional sense of duty to the general public in providing their services.
Their primary duty, however, was still to their client—whether that
client was the elected auditor of the company, or the shareholders of
the company (in the case where the chartered accountant was directly
elected as auditor). For that matter, chartered accountants were often
hired to play other roles such as liquidator or receiver in the British
system, but again, their role in those cases was not as a chartered ac-
countant per se, but instead as that officer and in accordance with
that officer's rights and obligations as set out in the various Compa-
nies Acts. 238
In this regulatory environment, then, a true reputation market-
place for accounting and audit services could flourish. Chartered ac-
countants picked up engagements as auditors, liquidators, or receivers
for companies, creditors, or government agencies—or as professional
"subcontractors" for others who filled those roles—based on their repu-
tations as trustworthy and competent agents for their hiring principals,
including, obviously, their facility with accounting. They were not
conflicted in these engagements by being required to act for two or
more principals on the same matter. Thus, no "auditor independence"
2" See Companies Act, 1929,19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 195 (Ens.).
248 SeeLiTurroN, supra note 22, at 279-80.
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rules developed or were needed in the British system existing at the
time of passage of the '33 Act (or '34 Act) in the United States.
II. THE QUEST FOR PROFESSIONAL RECOGNITION
Across the Atlantic, however, both auditing and accounting were
proceeding quite differently. The United States appears to have had
fewer worries about "free incorporation," so state statutes allowing the
formation of corporations simply upon registration cropped up ear-
lier than the Joint Stock Companies Act. of 1844 in Great Britain. 239
The result, however, was numerous different corporation laws with
little uniformity across the United States.24° Further, these were rela-
tively bare bones laws that centered on registration requirements and
formalities.241 There were no audit provisions, nor for that matter,
very many provisions for the protection of shareholders generall): 242
Of relevance here, too, may be the timing of the development of
corporations law in the United States. The American Revolution oc-
curred during the period that the Bubble Act was in effect through-
out the British Empire. Thus, the fledgling United States grew out of
a background in which virtually no companies were allowed.243 At the
same time, there was no longer any Crown to charter companies—the .
only way to establish companies under the Bubble Act. Thus, the only
other logical counterpart to a British authority with the power to cre-
ate companies would have been Congress. The history of the states as
separate colonies, however, perhaps originally linked more tightly to
Parliament and the Crown than to each other, coupled with the sub-
sequent chaotic period of the Revolution and the hesitant steps from
loose federation to republic through the War of 1812, may have fur-
ther entrenched the development of corporations law as a state,
rather than a federal matter. Additionally, the notion of central con-
trol of a basic, usually locally operating, commercial vehicle such as
the corporation may have been exactly the sort of thing that smacked
of the overbearing control of Parliament and the Crown, which the
239 See, e.g., supra note 44 (describing New York state statute).
240 sea e.g., BUREAU OF CORPS., U.S. DEP .T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS 39-40 (1904).
2" See infra notes 311-347 and accompanying text.
242 See infra notes 311-347 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 22-42 and accompanying text.
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new United States had revolted against, and so instead properly fell to
the powers reserved to the states under the U.S. Constitution. 244
At the same time, the widely distributed wealth of the new coun-
try—largely spread out among the small family farms that accounted
for ninety-five percent of the population245—likely reduced the need
for an audit tradition similar to that of the great English manors,
Similarly, the direct democracies of small town governments in the
colonies, later states, and their relatively uncomplicated financial rec-
ord keeping, 246
 may also have reduced the demand for audits of local
government officials.
The foregoing, compounded with the later development of in-
dusirialization in the United States than in Great Britain, resulted in a
slower development of the accounting profession and a largely absent
tradition of auditing up until the mid-1800s. 247
 Thus, when industri-
alization was well underway in the United States by the mid-1800s, the
nascent accounting profession was as decentralized and variable as
the corporations laws. 248
 With no real professional body, and no li-
censing requirements to attest to competency, the profession likely
was perceived as composed of "mere" bookkeepers of limited useful-
ness. Yet, as they had done in England, the developing industrial
businesses and railroads necessitated accounting and audit services, as
much as the ensuing speculative booms and busts did. 249
Even in the late 1800s, however, as the transformation of the
United States from an agrarian economy to an industrial one was
nearing completion, the disaggregated profession was unable to
achieve the same level of stature as its chartered counterparts in Eng-
land and Scotland—whose members indeed were even then "invad-
244 see, e.g., INDUS. COMM'N, FINAL. REPORT 645 (1902). In 1902, the federal Industrial
Commission stated the following:
It has long been considered a fundamental principle of our Government that
the States should retain a considerable proportion of the legal supervision of
business. In the main, at the present time, the various civil rights of our citizens,
including those rights which come under the law of contracts, are in the hands
of the separate States. [A change in this status quo], while it may eventually be
necessary, would prove centralizing to a degree to most people unthought of, in
connection with our form of government.
Id.
245 See GARY JOHN PREVITS & BARBARA DUBIS MERINO, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTANCY
IN THE UNIFED STATES: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCOUNTING 33-34 (1998).
246 See id. at 60.
247 See supra notes 22-105 and accompanying text.
246 See supra notes 22-105 and accompanying text.
249 See PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 245, at 66-73,81-91.
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ing" the United States to monitor substantial investments by British
syndicates. 250 Thus, from the long-awaited creation of the first Ameri-
can accountants' society in 1887, through the passage of the first CPA
law in 1896, to the passage of the '33 Act, a defining goal of account-
ants was arguably their status as members of a true profession. 2n Nev-
ertheless, the vagaries and inconsistencies of different state CPA laws
worked against any sort of national reliance on accountants based on
uniform minimum standards, such as existed for the English and
Scottish chartered accountants. Additionally, few if any laws, state or
federal, enshrined a role that seemed as custom built for accountants
as the British Companies Acts did, at least indirectly.
The only element that American accountants could control was
their association as a profession—and this they did by creating a "na-
tional" organization called the American Association of Public Ac-
countants in 1887. 252 The organization grew slowly, however, and was
comprised primarily of New York accountants through its first years, 253
By 1904, accountants seemed as likely to be members of local societies
as members of the "national" organization. Many of these local socie-
ties grew up as associations for newly minted CPAs under recent CPA
laws.254 In fact, these local societies were numerous and substantial
enough to create their own "Federation of Societies of Public Ac-
countants in the United States of America."255 As the confusion
reached a peak over the primacy of these accounting organizations, as
well as membership requirements—for example, could all account-
ants or only CPAs join?—the first International Congress of Account-
ants was held that year in St. Louis. 256 The International Congress
provided a "rallying point" for American accountants, who then man-
aged to merge or disperse their various professional associations such
that the American Association of Public Accountants could lay claim
as "the" association of the profession. 257
The profession, however, still sought to burnish its image to the
general public, to elevate itself above "mere bookkeepers," and to
250 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
251 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 45-46.
252 Sec id. at 36-38. This group is one of the precursors to the AICPA. Ironically, it was
largely started by a transplanted English chartered accountant. See id.; see also Ala. INST. OF
CERTIFIED Pun. ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 71.
255 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 39-40,49,
25' Sec id. at 49-52; see also supra notes 73-81.
255 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 49.
256 See id. at 49-52.
257 See id.
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take on weightier public service roles. 258
 In short, it wanted to be
viewed as a prestigious learned profession such as law or medicine.
The seeming attainment of this status by the English and Scottish
chartered accountants made this goal all the more tantalizing. 259
Opportunities to achieve this goal finally arose in the first two
decades of the twentieth century. First, some major companies, such
as the U.S. Steel Corporation and the American Tobacco Company,
began experimenting with public disclosure of audits that they al-
ready were having done for other internal or shareholder purposes.
Such public disclosure led to an increase in auditing work, generally
in the guise of a new "best practice" for major companies. 26° Second,
auditors increasingly found their work commissioned by corporate
clients, or others, in connection with credit facilities, investments, or
investigations that. involved a corporation.20
 Third, and most substan-
tially, the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion262
 expressly permitted Congress to institute an income tax—
which it did265—and dramatically increased the need for the services
of accountants, as many of them had accurately predicted. 2"
Public disclosure of corporate finances and governance also may
have been a preemptive response to increased calls for such disclo-
sure—termed "publicity" in the jargon of the timem—regarding the
inner workings of the powerful trusts that had come to dominate the
economic landscape. At the height of the "trust busting" era at the
turn of the century, the Final Report of the federal Industrial Com-
mission called for inter alia (1) disclosure and anti-fraud measures re-
lated to the offering or sale of stock to the public; (2) disclosure of
the nature of the business, and the powers and limitations of the di-
rectors and officers, of the publicly traded company in its certificate
of incorporation, which must then be available for public inspection;
(3) annual detailed financial reports to members or shareholders,
258 See id. at 45-46. One leading accountant from the time is quoted as frequently
quipping that It] he public thinks a public accountant is a bookkeeper out of a job—who
drinks." Id. at 46.
259 Sec supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
269 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 57-58,83-84.
261 Sec id. at 77; LtrriE-roN, supra note 22, at 298. In contrast, British audits rarely were
relied upon by third parties as discussed above. See supra notes 106-237 and accompanying
text.
262 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
263 Tariff of 1913 (Underwood Tariff Act), Pub. L. No. 63-16,38 Stat. 114 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
264 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 67-71.
265 See infra note 316 and accompanying text.
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"verified by a competent auditor"; and (4) publication of annual, de-
tailed financial reports, "properly audited" under oath and subject to
government in spec tion. 266
One member of the Industrial Commission, Thomas W. Phillips,
was allowed to append a statement. that went even further in its rec-
ommendations. His proposal would have pushed states to adopt uni-
form state corporation laws that inter din would establish "a rigid sys-
tem of public accounting"267 that would operate in two complemen-
tary ways:
First, each corporation should be required to make periodi-
cal reports of its business, supplemented by other reports
upon official demand, all verified by oaths of certain of its
officers. Second, official examiners should also be main-
tained, who should, at irregular periods and without notice,
appear at the offices of each corporation and make rigid ex-
amination of its affairs, using its books in the first instance,
but verifying the correctness thereof by every practicable
method. The reports of this official should be made to a su-
pervising official, and by him duly made public. 268
Phillips pointed out that similar systems were already put in place by
the federal government for banking concerns and manufactures of
certain items on which the government levied internal taxes. 266
Under his proposal, the annual reports would be made to an
officer designated as the auditor and would contain information
largely in accordance with that required under various reporting pro-
visions of the British Companies Acts as discussed above. 270 The audi-
tor would prescribe the form of the reports and could call for addi-
tional reports. As to the level of scrutiny authorized, "No detail of the
business of the corporation shall be considered private so as to be ex-
266 INDUS. COMM'N, Supra note 244, at 649-650 (including recommendations from pre-
liminary report in final report).
267 By "public accounting" Thomas W. Phillips appears simply to mean an "accOunting
to the public" on the part of the company, not the practice of being a public accountant as
described SUM notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
266 INDUS. COMM'N, supra note 244, at 669.
269 See id.
279 See id. at 670. Thomas W. Phillips does not state explicitly whether these provisions
intentionally followed many of the British precedents, nor whether the "auditor" should be
an accountant. See id. Likely, he deems thiS a permissive, rather than mandatory, aspect of
the system, as he also provides for "expert accountants" to act as examiners subordinate to
the auditor. See id. At the same time, however, the auditor can also play the role of an ex-
aminer at the auditor's own discretion, as discussed below. Id. at 671.
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empt from the examination of the auditor, whenever he may demand
report thereon."27I Most important, the auditor would make such re-
ports public, including a requirement that the final auditor approved
version would be published by the company in a newspaper in accor-
dance with regular custom for publication of corporate notices. 272
Appropriate penalties for corporations who attempted to evade or
frustrate this reporting system also would be included. 273
For "surprise" examinations, "expert accountants" 274
 would be
provided for and, under the direction of the auditor, appear without
notice and examine the books, property, records, and papers of the
corporation. 275
 These examiners also would "have the power to exam-
ine under oath all officers or employees of the corporation, or any
other person having any knowledge of its affairs"—all enforceable by
appropriate court action. 276
 Auditors themselves could also act as ex-
aminers at their sole discretion. 277
 But examiners could not inspect
any business if they were "interested in the business thereof, or of any
competing concern, or [if they hadj relatives who are so inter-
ested."278
It is not clear whether these auditors and examiners would be
government employees, or even contractors, or whether they would
instead be separate individuals or firms that then would be hired by
stock companies to satisfy legal requirements (analogous to the con-
temporary statutory audit system). Further, the remuneration mecha-
nism is not clearly specified.
Nonetheless, these proposals must have been terrifying to corpo-
rations big and small. Thus, in accordance with a well-worn pattern,
the biggest, most notorious companies and trusts likely felt it was in
their best interest to begin disclosing information on their own terms,
rather than wait for state or federal regulation. Accordingly, whether
evidencing a causal relationship or not, a number of these companies,
including those mentioned above, began commissioning audits by ex-
ternal CPAs with the results made publicly available. 279
271 Id. at 671.
272 Sec id.
272 See INDUS. COMNeN, supra note 249, at 671.
274
 Interestingly, 'certified public accountants' were not included—likely because not
all states had passed CPA laws by this time.
275 Id,




 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 57-58.
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At. the same time, the Industrial Commission's Final Report un-
derscored the problems of a system in which the states exclusively had
the power to create corporations:
It is important to observe that whenever any State has put
conservative restrictions upon corporations, either as to their
formation or their management, other States have taken ad-
vantage of the situation and enacted such liberal laws that.
corporations have removed to them from other States. Two or
three States have apparently, for the sake of securing a certain
revenue easily collected, bid against each other by offering
more liberal inducements to corporations. 280
So went an early formulation of. the "race to the bottom" feared as a
consequence of corporate "charter-mongering" among the states. 281
For this Article's purposes, though, it underscores the very different
starting points that the United Stales and Great Britain were operat-
ing from in matters of corporations and audits: the former had no
centralization of corporate laws, accountant certification, or securities
regulation, while the latter had all three. As explained below, these
crucial differences should have counseled against any easy adoption
by the United States of specific solutions, taken out of context, that
seemed to work in Great Britain.282
Fundamentally then, the development of accounting and audit-
ing—especially regarding provision of certified audits to clients for
"comfort" of interested third parties—was different in the United
States. The banking community may have agreed as one banker "as-
serted that the accountants' clients were both the stockholders or
owners of a business, and the investing public and their agent, the
banker."283 Coupled with the needs of the fledgling American profes-
sion for expanded work engagements and enhanced prestige, this
unique trajectory soon led the profession to offer its audit
certification services to clients on behalf of broader and broader
classes of third party beneficiaries. Additionally, unpopttlar corporate
empires were apparently only too eager to bring on other parties such
as accountants to deflect liability for financial misreporting.
280 INDUs. ComIkeN, supra note 244, at 642-43.
221 For a more contemporary account, see JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TKANSFORMATION
WALL STREET: A fltsTotcY OF THE. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN
CORPORATE FINANCE 42 (3d ed., Aspen Publishers 2003) (1982).
2(° See infra notes 464-481 and accompanying text.
289 CAREY, supra note 23, at 78.
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As early as 1910, the profession seemed to acknowledge this dif-
ferent trajectory, and in particular, appeared to disapprove of the lim-
ited nature of the British auditor's job:
"[The president of the ICAEW] believes that the auditor is
not "concerned in the volume of business a company does,
whether it is overtrading, whether its working capital is
sufficient, whether it is carrying on operations on too exten-
sive a scale in countries where credit is bad and economic
conditions are unfavorable"—nor should an auditor act or
appear to act as a valuer. However, if assets appear to him to
have been overvalued, lie should say so.
In the United States it is generally recognized that the dit-
ties of an auditor depend very much upon circumstances.
An auditor may certify merely to the correctness of the ac-
count-keeping, if that is all the directors of the company de-
sire. Frequently, however, audits are made on behalf, not of
directors, but of banks or intending investors or dissatisfied
stockholders, and in such cases it will not be generally admit-
ted in this country that an accountant has done his full duty
if he has discovered merely that the accounts and financial
statements are technically correct. The accountant's work
tinder such circumstances combines that of the investigator
and of the auditor."284
The author of the foregoing quotation seems to misunderstand
the metes and bounds of the British statutory auditor's role. As previ-
ously explained, the latter simply is elected by the shareholders to ver-
ify, on their behalf, that the reports presented by company manage-
ment fairly reflect the company's state of affairs. 285
 There is no provi-
sion for the British auditor to advance his opinions as to whether the
company is being correctly or well managed. So long as the reports
presented give shareholders an accurate view of the company, then
the shareholders can decide whether the company is being properly
run. If they believe that it is not, then they can bring about a change
in management through total or partial ouster of the current board of
directors.
Further, although British directors could hire or provide for their
own internal audit of the company—and one would imagine that
2134 Id. at 77 (quoting Editorial, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Nov. 1910).
2'6 See 514pro notes 223-229 and accompanying text.
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some did simply as part. of good governance and internal controls of
the organization—they were not "masters" of the statutory audit. and
auditors. Additionally, as to other sorts of non-statutory audits, such as
those commissioned by prospective creditors, it is not clear that the
British chartered accountant felt any more constrained as to the scope
of services than did an American counterpart. Even if the British
chartered accountant did feel more constrained, this just further un-
derscored the different context of "auditors" in the British tradition—
the auditor and audit are merely instruments for principals to make
sure that their agents are doing what they say they are doing, not to
cast judgment on the overall wisdom of the enterprise. There is no
doubt, however, that, upon proper engagement orders described as
an "audit" or otherwise, British chartered accountants could accom-
plish an equally penetrating investigation as their American counter-
parts.
Of course, just as the respectable segment of the American ac-
counting profession was trying to use these expanded new types of en-
gagements to burnish the image of the profession, 288 some other mem-
bers, of questionable motive and qualifications, used the mounting lu-
crative demand for such services to their own ends, offsetting whatever
salutary effects the former had. 287 A major window of opportunity for
the profession both to expand its services and reputation as a public
service minded, learned profession, however, was perceived in the pas-
sage of the new income tax law of 1913. 288 Often excluded, for one rea-
son or another, in much of the previous federal legislation or rulemak-
ing relevant to the profession, the American Association of Public Ac-
countants, was now ready to become an active player in shaping both
the passage and implementation of the new income tax law. 289 Through
a personal representative and a committee formed specifically for issues
of federal legislation, the American Association was able to have mean-
286 See id. at 54-55. An editorial in 1907 stated the following:
"Publicity is a safe and conservative remedy for most corporate abuses. The
certified public accountant is the authorized agent of publicity. Let popular
discussion of this subject proceed until the people shall demand that the af-
fairs of every public-service corporation, of every bank and of every insurance
company shall be regularly examined by certified public accountants who are
independent of the directors, if not also of the stockholders."
Id. (quoting Editorial, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Nov. 1907).
287 Sec id. at 83-84.
28° Tariff of 1913 (Underwood Tariff Act), Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2,38 Stat. 114,166-81
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
289 Sec CAREY, supra-note 23, at 67-71.
784	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 45:741
ingful participation in the drafting and passage of the law, securing
modified provisions of importance to the profession. 29°
The real payoff of the income tax law, of course, was the in-
creased business that it brought to CPAs by those trying to make sense
of, and get the best possible results under, the new tax system. 29 ' The
profession was well primed for the latter as well, based on its experi-
ence with corporate clients under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909. 292
Arguably, these sorts of engagements began aligning CPAs with their
corporate clients as advocates for the latter against the revenue seek-
ing goals of the government. If so, then tax services represented an
early form of "non-audit service" that potentially compromised the
accountants' perceived objective and independent status as to third
parties, in this case the government.
Even in the absence of any requirements for formal, public
audits, one might question the alignment of accountants and their
clients in efforts to minimize each client's tax burden while account-
ants were promoting their value as "independent" auditors and inves-
tigators. In fact, one member of the profession later proposed that the
American Association of Public Accountants formally petition the
Treasury Department to require attestation of income tax returns by
accountants on behalf of filers. 295 The American Association chose
not to act on this proposal, apparently fearing that it would spur re-
newed government interest in registering accountants, such as had
been proposed by the Federal Trade Commission (the "FTC") a year
earlier in 1916. 294 There was also some belief that "under Civil Service
Commission rules it would be impossible to appoint practicing ac-
countants as employees of the government."295 Over time, similar
proposals would surface, but they always were rejected overwhelm-
ingly as contrary to most accountants' views of themselves as "'advo-
cates" of their tax clients who engaged in "'adversary proceedings'"
against the Internal Revenue Service on behalf of those clients. 296 To
the extent that tax clients were also audit clients, it is not clear how
29° See id.
291 See id. at 146.
292 Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909 (Corporation Tax Act), ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11,
112-17; see CmiEv, supra note 23, at 64-67.
293 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 215-16.
294 See id. at 216.
295 Id.
296 Id.
2004)	 The Problem of Auditor Independence	 785
the accountant could be both an "advocate" on the tax side, while
"independent" on the audit side.
As accountants spread their services across larger swaths of the
economy, and provided an increasing array of accounting, audit, and
tax services with demonstrable effects on broader classes of third par-
ties, the question of legal liability was bound to arise. Further, as men-
tioned above, some accountants seemed to be not taking their role as
seriously as the leaders of the profession would like. 297 The following
two measures were suggested: first, import the English practice estab-
lished by the Companies Acts and have shareholders elect auditors,
rather than letting boards appoint them; second, and somewhat coun-
ter intuitively, encourage litigation against accountants so as to establish
the legal duties of auditors through the courts. 298 In particular, the
leaders of the accounting professions were relatively less concerned
with determining the liability of auditors who failed to catch evidence
of embezzlement within a corporate client, than with establishing clear
legal duties when investors suffer losses based on their misplaced reli-
ance on a defective auditor's certificate. Perhaps this tack of concern
was because the former seemed already a clearer case to make, assum-
ing some defect, or willful ignorance, in the audit process. The profes-
sion worried, correctly, that it was less clear whether auditors had any
duty, and hence liability, to third parties, such as investors.
Pursuant to the foregoing debate, an editorial in the profession's
Journal of Accountancy practically begged the courts and legislatures to
step in and to provide guidance:
"It would therefore seem to follow, if an auditor has failed
to exercise reasonable care ... that lie should be held in
some measure at least, responsible for losses sustained by in-
vestors.... One of the strongest inducements to this exer-
cise of conservatism in certification ... would be the possi-
bility of fixing upon the auditor legal liability for statements
In order to protect the public against inefficiency	 and
in order to protect the profession against the inclusion of
undesirable members we strongly advocate the theory that if
the laws today do not fix legal liability upon the auditor they
297 See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
29a See CAREY, supra now 23, at 80-81.
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should be so amended as to bring about that condition of
affairs. "299
The editorial board of the Journal of Accountancy would have done well
to remember the old adage, "be careful what you wish for." This plea
for legal regulation was ironically prescient.
Instead of requesting legal guidance, however, the profession
might have done better by simply considering the increasingly mud-
dled allegiances of the American accountant/auditor to his client.
Not the least of these problems was the difficulty of performing objec-
tive audits that led to qualified certificates because the client com-
pany's management was not fully cooperating with the auditor's re-
quest for documentation. In the British system under the Companies
Act, 1929, the auditor would have to report whether management had
cooperated with the audit.") The American auditor, however, was in a
bind: should the auditor give an unqualified certificate that was now
misleading and a dereliction of duty, or instead issue a qualified
certificate that would surely reflect unfavorably on company man-
agement., who would likely then fire that auditor? An editorial in the
Journal of Accountancy is quoted as musing that:
"Looking at the matter from the highest ethical view-
point, ... Mt must be admitted that the proper course for
the accountant to pursue would be to refuse to conduct an
audit unless opportunity were given for verifying inventories
and accounts receivable and all other things having a bear-
ing on the accounts.
But here the difficulty arises that many clients would be es-
tranged thereby, and unfortunately some accountants are
not yet in a position to ignore the financial considera-
tion.... The average accountant is not sufficiently inde-
pendent to be able to dictate in this respect."301
Although it is likely that the editorial board did not mean "inde-
pendent" in the sense that term has taken on under the '33 Act and
'34 Act, it is again oddly appropriate that they chose the phrase "not
sufficiently independent" to present the glaring reality that many ac-
countants would not be affluent enough to avoid being beholden to
299 Id. at 81-82(quoting Editorial, J. ACCOUNTANCY, May 1912).
300 See Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23; supra notes 176, 208 and accompa-
nying text.
8111 CAREY, supra note 23, at 82-83 (quoting Editorial, J. ACCOUNTANCY, 114.).
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their paying clients. This should not have been a surprise. How many
accountants were affluent enough not to have to worry about retaining
clients and getting paid? Of course, the accountants themselves al-
ready had the answer—switch to the British system and have auditors
elected by the shareholders, which included allowing those share-
holders to set auditor remuneration. Regardless, neither the profes-
sion as a whole, nor external lawmaking bodies, apparently were will-
ing to effectuate this change. Alternatively, it may simply have been
one of those things that fell through the cracks between different. sys-
tems of regulation for and among accountants, corporations, and the
financial services industry.
At any rate, much of this hand wringing by accountants, and Pro-
gressive Era reform rhetoric by government officials and commissions,
seems to have been drowned out by the economic boom of the Roaring
Twenties. Few people are interested in reform when everyone is mak-
ing money—the overriding concern is instead to get. in on the action
before it is too late. In tandem with the economy, then, the accounting
practice boomed from 1916 to 1930.302 Concurrently; although compa-
nies were not required by state or federal law to do so, many increas-
ingly came to disclose audited financial statements in connection with
issuances of new securities. 303 The optimist might say these companies
did this because they believed it was the right thing to do; the cynic
might say that this was really just a marketing ploy to attract attention in
an increasingly crowded field of issuances. Whatever the real motive,
the trend played into the desires of accountants to grow their practices,
and what could have been more alluring than the high profile "public"
engagement of certifying a hot new stock issuance?
Argtiably, the bigger, more respected accounting firms—many of
which ironically were originally started by transplanted English and
Scottish chartered accountants 304—were worth a premium through the
quality signaling function they could perform for corporate issuers, es-
pecially new or unknown ones. This phenomenon certainly exists to-
clay; when new or untested companies piggyback on the "legitimacy" of
brand name accounting firms, law firms, or investment banks to assure
prospective investors. Even established companies will use the reputa-
tion of these professional service •providers to gain extra valuation in a
deal, or to coax uneasy parties into an unorthodox deal structure.
302 Sec id. at 144.
"3 Sec id.
" Sec id. at 22,27-30,33-35.
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This theory of "reputational intermediaries" who rent their repu-
tation to others who currently lack such a reputation in the market-
place has been well documented in the literature." 5 It also has at-
tracted some serious criticism, including perhaps the most important
rejoinder that it does not comport well with the way the history of the
marketplace has actually played out." 8
 It is also unlikely that an
efficient market for reputational intermediaries—necessary to induce
them to maintain their reputation through demonstrated integrity
and objectivity—can exist in today's highly concentrated market
dominated by the Big Four accounting firms.387 Such an efficient
market, however, could exist in a world of "pure play" account-
ing/audit firms, with appropriate distribution of market share among
a number of competitive players. 008 In fact, the accounting/audit
marketplace of the early decades of the twentieth century was a more
compelling environment for the reputational intermediary system to
flourish. Indeed, it may have been that this environment was precisely
what created the signaling practices of accounting and other profes-
sional services firms in the real world that endured and led to the
suggestion of the theory decades later. If so, then the question to be
addressed below is whether the audit requirements of the '33 Act, and
rules promulgated under the '34 Act, shored up a budding, construc-
tive practice, or whether instead they froze in time an experiment that
may have died out on its own through "natural" market forces.
In the meantime, accountants simply rode the boom, with only
minor trepidations as they saw instances of shoddy audits, and im-
proper usage of respected firms' names, certificates, or misleading
snippets of reports by companies eager to gain the quality signaling
sos The literature provides a more detailed discussion of reputational intermediaries, See
Reinier Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L,J. 857,
888-98 (1984); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict
Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491,491 (2001). See generally Stephen Choi, Market Lessons
for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 916 (1998); JonN C. COFFEE, THE ACQUIESCENT GA'IT.-
KEEPER: REPUTATIONAL INTERMEDIARIES, AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE AND THE GOVERNANCE
OF ACCOUNTING (Cu. for Law & Econ. Studies, Columbia Law Sch., Working Paper No. 191,
2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.corn/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=270944
 (date
posted May 25, 2001); Ronald]. Gilson, Willie Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984); Reinter Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party En-
forcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986).
906 See &W. Mayhew et al., The Effect of Accounting Uncertainty and Auditor Reputation on
Auditor Objectivity, AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY, Sept. 2001, at 49-70 (documenting that
reputational intermediaries act in reputation depleting ways to a degree not predicted by
the theory).
307 See Partnoy, supra note 305, at 491.
908 See O'Connor, supra note 14, at 68-69.
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function of a prestigious firm's "endorsement" of their issuances." 9
Considering the 'boom in stock issuance certification work, tax en-
gagements with all the newly wealthy individuals and companies seek-
ing to reduce their tax burdens, accounting system consulting work
generated from tax clients who wished to do better on their taxes next
year, and audits pursuant to commercial bankers' increased demands
for them from the accountants' clients, the profession found its serv-
ices almost inexhaustibly in dernand."° Also, a rising demand curve
usually leads to higher valuations of the underlying goods or services,
which in turn often leads to greater perceived prestige of them. Not
bad for a bunch of "bookkeepers" who had a hard time getting organ-
ized and recognized only a few decades before.
111. THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
Of course, all good things must end. With what now might seem
a depressingly predictable pattern, another great speculative boom
collapsed and took down many paper fortunes. In the first aftermath
of the 1929 crash, "populist scapegoats" were rounded up and prose-
cuted."' Poster boys for 1920s material success were quickly trans-
formed into poster boys for everything that was greedy and evil. 312
Additionally, true to the pattern, even before the finger-pointing sub-
sided, reformist legislation was in the offing in the form of the '33
Act. One commentator has suggested that regulation following in the
wake of a collapsed bubble is "the mirror image of the bubble—a kind
of speculative frenzy in regulation."9"
Stoked by the harshness of the 1929 crash, the self-righteous in-
dignation growing from the daily closes of outrageous abuses dis-
closed from the Senate chamber, where the Pecora Investigation was
taking place, and the reformist allies of President Franklin D. Roose-
velt, who were hammering away at the evils that may have been pre-
vented by proper regulation of business and the financial community,
the public essentially demanded' congressional action. 314 Thus, when
" See CAREY, supra note 23, at 145. One respected firm was forced to place a warning
note regarding improper use on its reports. See id.
31° See id. at 145-48.
3" See Ribstein, supra note 39, at 91-92:
" 2 See id.
"3 Id. at 78.
714 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281. at 39. Dean Joel Seligman provides a more detailed
background on the immediate responses to the 1929 crash, such as the Pecora Investiga-
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President Roosevelt signed the '33 Act into law in May of 1933, it
seemed perhaps a hasty response to public outcry. In fact, though,
President Roosevelt's own frequent invocation of Louis D. Brandeis's
famous study; Other People's Money, published in 1914,315 belies the
roots of the '33 Act, and subsequent '34 Act, in the earlier Progressive
Era that had been eclipsed by the Roaring Twenties. Thus, one histo-
rian of federal securities regulation pinpointed President Roosevelt's
comments as "paraphras[ing the famous quote from "Other People's
Malley"]: 'Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; elec-
tric light the most efficient policeman.'"316
This could not have been better news for the accounting profes-
sion—the self-proclaimed "authorized agents of publicity."3" Further,
only a year earlier the NYSE adopted rules, in consultation with the
Institute of Accountants in the United States of America (the "Insti-
tute"), 318
 to require that all listed companies have their financial
statements certified by accountants "qualified under the laws of some
state or country." 19
In fact, the Institute had earlier approached the NYSE in 1927 to
suggest requirements for better financial disclosure from listed com-
panies, but while the boom continued apace, there seems to have
been little incentive for the NYSE to tinker with success. 32° Ironically;
only five years earlier it was the NYSE itself that was musing about bet-
ter financial disclosure "in line with the English practice." 321 The Jour-
nal of Accountancy is quoted as concurring with the position: "'What
can and should be done by legislation and effective public administra-
tion is to throw a light of publicity upon the issuance of securities that
Lion. See id. at 18-38; see also CAREY, Silpro note 23, at 167-69 (discussing the Peron' Inves-
tigation).
315 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 41. See generally Louts D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEO-
PLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE 1T (Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press 1933)
(1914).
316
 Id. at 41-42 (quoting BRANDEIS, supra note 315, at 89). It is ironic that Louis D.
Brandeis is also the author of the seminal work that is commonly acknowledged as the
beginnings of the legal right to privacy. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Bran-
deis, The Right to Privacy, 4 FlAttv. L. Rim 193 (1890).
317
 See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
ND
 The Institute of Accountants in the United States of America is another forerunner
of the A1CPA.
319 CAREY, supra note 23, at 169.
329 Sec id. at 163-64.
351 Id. at 160. Notably, the Journal of Accountancy is quoted as calling for audits in con-
junction with securities offerings still earlier, in 1919. See id. at 145 (citing J. ACCOUNTANCY,
Jan. 1919).
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will enable investors to judge for themselves whether a given security
is sound and to what extent it is speculative. "22 Apparently the Jour-
nal of Accountancy also expressly advocated for adoption of provisions
from the British Companies Acts, including "independent audits." 323
A noted accounting historian has suggested that if action along these
lines had been taken—"if the business and financial community had
disciplined itself in time"—then the '33 Act might not have been
needed. Of course, the community did not discipline itself adequately
because "[t]he stock market was zooming, corporations were merg-
ing, and holding companies in the utility field were developing vast
empires, financed by issue after issue of common stock." 324
Nevertheless; by the early 1930s, the accounting profession began
getting the kind of legal guidance it had been clamoring for since the
turn of the century. In 1931, the New York Court of Appeal decided
the landmark appeal of Ultramares Cord. v Touche. 325 Judge Benjamin
N. Cardozo, writing for the court, was willing to find that accountants
certifying financial statements had to make the certificate without
fraud. This duty ran to third-party creditors and investors as well, be-
cause the accountants knew that these parties might also rely on the
certification. 32° Further, Judge Cardozo cautioned that "[1]rand in-
cludes the pretense of knowledge when knowledge there is none."327
Judge Cardozo was unwilling, hOwever, to extend liability to such "in-
determinate" third parties for actions based on mere negligence, be-
cause then a "thoughtless slip or blunder," including the "failure to
detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries,"
could "expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount.
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."328 Thus, ac-
countants who performed their audits in good faith, and who did not
attest to transactions for which  they had seen no documentary evi-
dence, should not have any liability to third parties not included ex-
322 Id. at 161 (quoting J. ACCOUNTANCY, n.d.).
323 Id. (citing J. ACCOUNTANCY, n.d.). In truth, the Companies Acts do not call for "in-
dependent audits," but rather simply audits clone by auditors elected by the shareholders,
who may employ professional accountants. A professional accountant could be elected
directly as an auditor, and he might have no other interest in the company other than this
engagement. But, there was no requirement for this, the only real hallmark of "independ-
ence" as we consider it today.
324 CAREY, supra note 23, at 161.
323 174 N.E. 441, 442 (N.Y. 1931).
326 See hi. at 444
927 Id.
328 Id,
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pressly as formal beneficiaries of the engagement contract—even if it
was foreseeable that the client might use the certificate in the future
with as yet unnamed parties.
One might question why the court was willing to find liability to
third parties for fraudulent misrepresentation, but not for negli-
gence—was it just because fraud is more serious in some way? Per-
haps, but the court also was concerned that the extension of liability
to third parties for negligence would render fraud and negligence
nearly coterminous.329
 The court also may have been considering that
fraud in this case sounded in tort, but negligence in performing the
audit was actually a breach of the contract between the accountant
and client. Thus, even though one generally might owe a duty of care
to the whole world that one can breach through negligent behavior,
here the specific shortcoming was not a negligent breach of that gar-
den variety duty of care, but rather it was the negligent breach of a
specific implied duty arising only under the contractual relationship
of the parties. That is, accountants must provide audits "with the care
and caution proper to their calling."3" As a result, to extend this con-
tractual duty to others outside the chain of privity was both unwar-
ranted and would result in a situation in which "[t] lie hazards of a
business conducted on these terms [would be] so extreme as to en-
kindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty
that exposes to these consequences."32
Ultra mares provides an additional fascinating insight into the
changing environment for accountants acting as auditors. The plain-
tiff was asked to rebut the claim that allowing liability to third parties
for negligence would make negligence nearly indistinguishable from
fraud. The plaintiff responded by arguing, "first, that the duty to
speak with care does not arise unless the words are the culmination of
a service, and, second, that it does not arise unless the service is ren-
dered in the pursuit of an independent calling, characterized as pub-
lic."332
 This suggests the development of the mistaken notion that
"public accountants" are called that because they owe some extra duty
329 See id. at 447.
33° Ultrawares, 174 N.E. at 444.
33 ' Id. The court is not strictly limiting liability for negligence to parties in privity, but
rather it is limiting such liability to parties in privity or when a specified third party is so
clearly an intended third party beneficiary of the contract, so as to make him essentially a
party thereto.
332 Id. at 448.
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to the public at large that private citizens do not. 333 As discussed
above, however, this simply was not the origin of the name, nor the
intent of the early accountants using it. 334 Judge Cardozo catches this
error and corrects it, as quoted earlier in this Article. 335
Clearly, Ultramares is a mixed bag for accountants. On the one
hand, the case establishes that negligence in the audit engagement and
resultant certificate does not open accountants to liability to third par-
ties—even for liabilities that were foreseeable. On the other hand, li-
ability for fraud attaches on behalf of third parties just as much as it
does for the paying client, On one level, the result makes perfect sense
because service providers are primarily responsible to their contractual,
paying clients, but they are not allowed to mislead others intentionally
along the way, especially if reliance is foreseeable. 336 On another level,
however, the result makes no sense at all, because the accountants then
must be acting, to varying degrees, on behalf of at least three distinct
groups, whose interests may not completely overlap—management,
shareholders, and creditors. Thus, an unintentional message of Ultra-
maws may be that accountants simply should not act as auditors on be-
half of multiple parties in the same matter, explicitly or implicitly. Of
note, all of the foregoing is simply in general accordance with the Brit,
ish audit system under the Companies Act, 1929. 337
Although Ultramares clarified the common law governing audit.
services, a new federal legislative plan for regulating corporations and
their securities that would completely transform the legal landscape
for audits was being formulated as part of Franklin D. Roosevelt's
presidential campaign. The first and perhaps most crucial component
of this plan was set forth in President Roosevelt's nomination accep-
tance speech. Beyond the famous promise of a "New Deal" for Amer-
ica, he proposed to undertake:
"[A] comprehensive planning for the reconstruction of the
great credit groups . list an important place for that prize
statement of principle in the platform here adopted calling
for the letting in of the light of day on issues of securities,
333 See infra notes 464-489 and accompanying text (repeating theme).
334 Sec supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
333 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
338 Note that in Ultramares it is management of the client company itself that does
much of the fraud and deceit that leads to the defective certificate. 174 N.E. at 442. Thus,
the real question that the court is grappling with is to what degree the accountants were
complicit in this fraud.
337 See supra notes 106-238 and accompanying text.
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foreign and domestic, which are offered for sale to the in-
vesting public. "558
In particular, President Roosevelt wanted to federalize corporation
laws so as to reinstate the sorts of shareholders' protections that had
eroded in the wake of excessive charter-mongering among the
states."9
 Taken together, the changes in state corporation laws al-
lowed corporate managers to gain entrenched control of a company
in a manner that proved exceedingly difficult for increasingly disag-
gregated general shareholders to counter. 34° To this end, the meteoric
growth of businesses in numbers and size, the ascendancy of a class of
professional managers, and the expansion of shareholder ranks for
large companies to transnational levels, worked together with changes
in the state corporation laws to create the serious agency problems of
the modern corporation set out so well by Adolph A. Berle, Jr. and
Gardiner C. Means in 1932. 341
States had attempted to ameliorate these problems, at least with
regard to sales of corporate securities, by enacting "Blue Sky" laws as
early as 1911. 542
 Kansas began the trend—and gave the similar statutes
that were adopted in other states their name 343—with a law that re-
quired companies who wished to sell stock in the state to file a de-
scription of operations with the bank commissioner. The commis-
sioner could refuse to give the requisite sales permit when:
[H]e found any aspect of the company's business to be "un-
fair, unjust, inequitable, or oppressive to any class of con-
tributors, or if he decides from his examination of its affairs
that said investment company is not solvent and does not in-
tend to do a fair and honest business, and in his judgment
does not promise a fair return on the stocks, bonds or other
securities by it offered for sale."s44
As such, this law, and similar laws that followed, permitted so-called
"merits review" by the state authorities, which was markedly different
555 SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 19 (quoting Speech of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1 THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES or FRANKLIN D. Roost:xi:yr 653 (1938).
358 See id. at 42-44.
54° See id.
341
 See generally BERLE 11EANS, supra note 61.
342 SecSELIGAIAN, supra note 281, at 44-46.
545 Such a law was 'popularly known as a 'blue sky' law, since it was intended to check
stock swindlers so barefaced they 'would sell building lots in the blue sky.'" Id. at 44.
911 Id.
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from the British system tinder :the Companies Acts, which instead
merely mandated truthful disclosure of relevant information.
Despite initial success stories that prompted nearly identical stat,
utes in seventeen states, and other securities regulation statutes in six
others, the statutes were, in fact, not particularly effective. 345 Nonethe-
less, after Kansas's law was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1917,
even more states signed on with their own laws so that by 1933, every
state save Nevada had one. 346 After the 1929 crash, however, it became
readily apparent that these trumpeted laws had not really worked: most.
could be evaded through stock offerings by mail that crossed state lines
and many laws were amended so often as to render them impotent. 347
Ironically, one noted historian of the securities laws has suggested
that the NYSE listing requirements established during the 1920s were,
relatively speaking, the most effective securities regulation of the era. 348
After quoting William Z. Ripley's statement that [b]eyond peradven-
ture of doubt the New York Stock Exchange is today the leading
influence in the promotion of adequate disclosure [,]" and Adolph A.
Berle, Jr.'s statement that "'the most forward-looking steps in finance
taken during the 1925-1929 boom were not taken by government, but
by that much maligned institution, the New York Stock Exchange [,]'"
Dean Joel Seligman nonetheless noted that the NYSE requirements
were not much more effective than Blue Sky laws. 549 Other American
stock exchanges fared even worse, especially when they permitted ex-
tensive trading in unlisted securities. 35°
Dean Seligman also pointed to the "primitiveness of accounting
standards" as a fatal flaw for fair and effective securities markets. 351 At
the same time, at the beginning of the boom, less than seventy percent
of NYSE listed firms were bound by agreements to provide sharehold-
ers with annual or quarterly statements, and only 242 out of 957 listed
firms provided both annual and quarterly statements to shareholcl-
ers.552 By 1933, however, all of the 1157 listed firms provided annual
reports; sixty percent also provided quarterly reports; and eighty-five
345 See id. at 45.
346 See id.
347 SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 45-46.
Ma Sec id. at 46-47.
Id. (quoting WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (Harpe• Bros.
1939) (1927) and statement of Adolph A. Berle, in RUDOLPH WEISSMAN, THE NEW WALL
STREET (1939)).
35° Sec id. at 47.
351 Id. at 48.
352 SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 48.
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percent underwent annual audits by CPAs with the results made pub-
licly available.353
 Dean Seligman also noted that "[t]he rapidity with
which periodic audited financial statements became commonplace
masked the continued unreliability of financial reporting" because "no
government or private agency effectively defined generally accepted
accounting principles." 354
 Beyond this, however, as argued above, the
rapid rise in the use of audited statements may have been mainly a
marketing ploy, or, more generously, a quality signaling best practice, to
attract investors in a quickly crowding field of issuances.
The only congressional precedent for federal regulation of securi-
ties was a limited six-month episode in 1918 during World War 1.555
The Capital Issues Committee, authorized by Congress, may have been
simply a wartime expediency. Yet, in final reports, it urged continuing
federal supervision of securities—especially as the patriotism-driven
success of the government's Liberty Bonds seemed to have whetted
the appetite of a whole new segment of the general population for
even more speculative investments. 355
 Although President Woodrow
Wilson argued for permanent federal securities regulation, and nu-
merous bills were introduced in Congress over the years, no other
formal regulation was initiated until passage of the '33 Act. 357
When Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected President on his New
Deal platform, however, forces finally aligned to prioritize and to real-
ize the goal of federal securities regulation earlier articulated by both
Louis Brandeis and Woodrow Wilson. 358
 The Pecora Investigation had
whipped up such sentiment against Wall Street and the securities in-
dustry among members of Congress and the public, that the former
essentially were forced to act.359
 After some false starts, an initial draft
by Huston Thompson, a former member of the FTC, (the "Thompson
draft") was introduced in both houses in March of 1933, along with a
preliminary message from President Roosevelt: 360
333 See M.
334 Id.
355 See id. at 49. This, of course, is in addition to the earlier Progressive Era calls for
corporate and securities regulations discussed above, but none of those materialized into
concrete bills or actions. See supra notes 260-279 and accompanying text.
336 SCCSEIAGMAN, supra note 281, at 48.
957 Id. at 49.
3513 Sec id. at 50-51.
359 See James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 Coo. WASH.
L. REV. 29, 30 (1959).
36° See id. at 30-31.
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To the Congress:
I recommend to the Congress legislation for Federal supervi-
sion of traffic in investment securities in interstate commerce.
In spite of many State statutes the public in the past has
sustained severe losses through practices neither ethical nor
honest on the part of many persons and corporations selling
securities.
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should
not take any action which might be construed as approving
or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in the
sense that their value will be maintained or that the proper-
ties which they represent will earn profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that
every issue of new securities to be sold in interstate com-
merce shall be accompanied by full publicity and informa-
tion, and that no essentially important element attending
the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.
This proposal acids to the ancient rule of caveat emptor
the further doctrine, "Let. the seller also beware." It puts the
burden of telling the whole truth on the seller. It should give
impetus back to honest dealing in securities and thereby
bring back public confidence.
The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the
public with the least possible interference to honest business.
This is but one step in our broad purpose of protecting in-
vestors and depositors. It should be followed by legislation
relating to the better supervision of the purchase and sale of
all property dealt in on exchanges, and by legislation to cor-
rect unethical and unsafe practices on the part of officers
and directors of banks and other corporations.
What we seek is a return to a clearer understanding of the
ancient. truth that those who manage banks, corporations,
and oilier agencies handling or using other people's money
are trustees acting for others.
—Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House, March 29, 1933."
Bet 73 Corn;. Rec. 937 (1933), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL SECURITIES Laws: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 19331982, at 20 (comp. by Sec. Law Comm., Fed. Bar Ass'n, 1983).
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President Roosevelt seemed concerned that the legislation
should neither authorize merits review of securities by the federal
government nor appear to attach liability to the federal government
for securities that appeared to have its imprimatur (like Treasury
bonds). Apparently, however, Huston Thompson "didn't get the
memo" on this because his draft explicitly permitted the FTC to re-
voke the registration of any offeror whose "affairs are in unsound
condition or insolvent" or when "the enterprise or business of the is-
suer, or person, or the security is not based upon sound principles,
and ... revocation is in the interest of the public welfare." 362
 Beyond
these undesirable merits review provisions, however, the Thompson
draft was deemed unsatisfactory in many other ways as well by the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (the "Commerce
Committee") of the House of Representatives to whom it had been
referred.363 It did not fare as poorly in the Senate, where it was ini-
tially referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.364 Despite the drub-
bing the Thompson draft took both from the House committee
members and later historians, it is actually not that crazy, nor does it
represent a radical departure from the major outlines of either the
British Companies Act, 1929, or the final version of the '33 Act. In
fact, the introduction, inter aria, of a waiting period after filing and
before the stock can be sold arguably made the '33 Act more of a de-
parture from the Companies Act, 1929, than the Thompson draft was.
For this Article's purposes, the most important provisions of the
Thompson draft exist in this same section 6 which contained the con-
troversial powers of the FTC to revoke registrations. Most of the trig-
gers for this power were probably uncontroversial: violation of the act
or orders of the FTC; fraudulent activities of the issuer; dishonesty or
fraudulent representations by the issuer, especially' in prospectuses or
similar documents; and illegal activities of the issuer's business. 365 It
was only the two last specific triggers of the section, cited in the dis-
cussion above, that were based on the controversial merits review the-
36' See H.R. 4314, § 6 (1933), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECURITIES ACTS,
supra note I, at 13; see also Landis, supra note 359, at 30-31.
363 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 51-57; Landis, supra note 359, at 31-33. For politi-
cal reasons, the draft was originally subjected merely to "perfecting amendments" by the
new drafting team led by Felix Frankfurter, but ultimately even those portions of Huston
Thompson's draft that were originally retained were "happily discarded." Landis, supra
note 359, at 34,
364 SeeSF,LicmAN, supra note 281, at 67-68; Landis, supra note 359, at 41-42.
363 See H.R. 4314, § 6, reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECURITIES ACTS, supra
note I, at 12-15.
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ory. Beyond these specific triggers, however, section 6 also sets out the
rights of the ITC as to how it would conduct an examination to de-
termine whether any of the triggers have occurred:
In making such examination the [FTC] or other officer or
officers designated by it shall have access to and may compel
the production of all the books and papers of such issuer,
representatives, or underwriters, and may administer oaths
to and examine the officers of such issuers, representatives,
underwriters, or other entities or other person connected
therewith as to its business and affairs and may, in its discre-
tion, require the production of a balance sheet exhibiting
the assets and liabilities of any issuer, representative, or un-
derwriter, or his income statement, or both, to be certified
by a public accountant approved by the [FTC]. 36°
This was, of course, no general requirement for an audit, but
rather only a targeted provision of audited financial statements in fur-
therance of a government investigation. From the auditor's perspective,
he would be retained for a specific limited engagement with a specific
third party beneficiary—and thus, under the reasoning of Ulimmares,
he would have full liability under both fraud and negligence theories to
that beneficiary. There likely would be little incentive for collusion with
management in this matter, however, even though the audited com-
pany would technically be the paying party in this transaction.
The Institute, in the meantime, had been made aware that such a
bill was in the offing, but chose not to appear formally during any hear-
ings for fear of hostile questioning and further bad public relations.367
When Thompson's draft came out, however, the Institute's members
quickly noticed the FTC examination audit provision and sent a letter
to the Commerce Committee suggesting that this audit provision
should be extended to all registration statements. 368 The letter was pos-
sibly followed up with personal lobbying by the Institute's Washington
legal counsel, J. Harry Covingto10 69 One accounting historian has as-
serted that the foregoing "apparently made an impression on the
366 Id. at 5.
367 See CAREY, SliPrli note 23, at 183. The profession itself often had been lumped in
with all of the other purported bad actors when the entire financial services industry came
under fire in the wake of the 1929 crash,
368 Sec id. at 184.
369 See id.
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House Committee on Interstate Commerce, since its bill was amended
to include the audit provisions which finally became the law." 37°
At the same time, and quite uncoordinated with the Institute and
J. Harry Covington, the then president of the New York State Society
of Certified Public Accountants, Colonel Arthur H. Carter, took it
upon himself to contact the Senate's Committee on Banking and
Currency (the "Banking Committee"), to which the Thompson bill
had been redirected from the Committee on the Judiciary. 371
 Colonel
Carter "was a West Point graduate, a man of action and of military
mien," as well as a senior partner at Haskins and Sells. 372 Not part of
the current governing council of the Institute, he instead sent his
telegram on behalf of the New York Society. In it, he too suggested an
audit by "'accountants qualified under the laws of some state" of
financial statements to be used in prospectuses. 373 The communica-
tion won him a place at the Banking Committee's upcoming hearings
on the Thompson draft. The full transcript provides many fascinating
exchanges, relevant not only to the profession's desire to win the
audit provision, but also for many issues of auditor independence to
come. Accordingly, much of the record is transcribed below, with ap-
propriate commentary:
Mr. CARTER. At the outset I wish to state that my sympa-
thies are with the general principles of the proposed bill
known as the Federal Securities Act. I also wish to have it
understood that I would advocate that, if possible, the pro-
posed bill be changed so as to afford even greater protection
to the investor than it now contemplates. .
... I would suggest that the following be added after the
words "actual business":
The accounts pertaining to such balance sheet, state-
ment of income and surplus shall have been examined by
an independent public accountant and his report shall
present his certificate wherein he shall express his opinion
as to the correctness of the assets, liabilities, reserves, capi-
tal and surplus as of the balance sheet date and also the
income statement for the period indicated.
37° Id.
371
 See id. at 184-85; Landis, supra note 359, at 31.
372 CAREY, supra note 23, at 184-85.
"3 Id. (quoting Letter from Col. Arthur H. Carter (Mar. 30, 1933)).
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Senator BARKLEY, How much more and additional em-
ployment would that give to certified accountants?
Mr. CARTER. Eighty-five percent of the companies that are
listed on the exchanges in New York today are examined.
Senator REYNOLDS. Do you think it proper to insert there
that these independent public accountants should be privi-
leged to state their opinion as to the value of securities or
the condition of the company?
Mr. CARTER. We are tillable to express an opinion as to the
value of securities 	 . 374
Colonel Carter appears to have misunderstood Senator Reynolds's line
of questioning; Senator Reynolds clearly seems to be asking why ac-
countants should get such a valuable government-mandated franchise,
Senator REYNOLDS. Do you think they should be permitted
to express their opinions about [the accounting recordsj?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Senator REYNOLDS. Will not the figures themselves show?
Mr. CARTER. The figures will not necessarily show. . . .
Senator BARKLEY. Do you think that. the Federal Trade
Commission's records or these reports ought to be encum-
bered by the bookkeeping processes by which accountants
would arrive at. an opinion as to the value of a stock?
Mr. CARTER. I do not see how the Federal Trade Commis-
sion can properly discharge its duty by merely accepting a
statement that has not been independently examined and
certified to by an accountant.
Senator BARKLEY. Iu other words, after the statement has
been filed by the officers of the company you want an inde-
pendent organization to go over it and then report to the
Federal Trade Commission whether this is correct. or not?
Mr. CARTER. I mean that that statement itself should have
been the subject of an examination and audit by an inde-
pendent accountant.
Senator GORE. Before filing?
Mr. CARTER. Before filing.
574 Hearings, wpm note 1, at 56-62 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
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Senator GORE, Is that patterned after the English system?
Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir.375
This was not exactly true. The Companies Act, 1929, merely provides
that the company's auditor must certify the company's profit and loss
statements—not balance sheets—for the last three years, as applica-
ble, for inclusion in any prospectus to be used for offering to sell
stock to the public. 376
Senator WAGNER. Well, basically, are not these facts that
have got to be alleged rather than an opinion?
Mr. CARTER. Under the terms of the bill it has to be given
under oath. I do not see that anyone can certify under oath
that a balance sheet giving many millions of dollars of assets
is as a matter of fact correct. He can state his opinion based
upon a thorough investigation.
Senator BARKLEY. In other words, before the officers of
the company that is issuing stock shall file that statement
that is contained in this bill with the Federal Trade Commis-
sion the company must call in outside independent account-
ants and give them the job of going over it and passing on
whether they have told the truth or not. Well, I am not for
your amendment, I will say that now.
Mr, CARTER. Later on in the act it provides that the Com-
mission may call for such a statement. The only point I am
trying to make is this, that I think the such an examination
should be a part of the application rather than after the ap-
plication has been filed.
Senator ADAMS. The law does not require any examina-
tion, as I read it.
Mr. CARTER. No.
Senator ADAMS. That is, it merely requires the filing of this
statement.
Mr. CARTER. That is right.
Senator ADAMS. Then by the fact of filing this statement
they in substance get the right to go into interstate com-
merce and sell securities. There is no such requirement for
examination to be included in the application. 377
375 hi. at 56-57 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
376 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
377 Hearings, supra note 1, at 57 (statement of Cal. Arthur H. Carter).
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Colonel Carter seems to be unaware of the larger context behind this
line of questioning. As discussed above, one of the major sore points
for the Thompson draft was its inclusion of merits review powers for
the FTC.378 At the same time, the Banking Committee members seem
to be concerned that "opinions" will not be of much help to investors,
either when deciding to invest in a company, or in bringing a lawsuit
for fraud or negligence later.
Mr. CARTER. Not in the application. But there is in the bill
a provision which gives the Commission a right to demand
such an investigation and demand such a report as a result
of such investigation. My point is to put that in the applica-
tion in the beginning.
Senator BARKLEY. Do you think it is more in the interest of
the public that is to buy these securities, if there is to be any
check up or any guarantee as to the correctness, that it be
done by some Government agency rather than by some pri-
vate association of accountants?
Mr. CARTER. I think it is an impractical thing for the Gov-
ernment agency to do it effectively.
Senator REYNOLDS. Why?
Mr. CARTER. Because it involves such a large force. It in-
volves the question of time.
Senator REYNOLDS. Well, it would not require any more
time on the part of government officials to make a check up
and audit than it would by private individuals, would it?
Mr. CARTER. I think the public accountant is better
equipped to do that than the average government agency
would be able to dO that.
Senator GORE. How many public accountants do you think
would be available for this service?
Mr. CARTER. There are approximately 15,000 certified
public accountants in the United States today qualified tin-
der the laws of the various States.
Senator BARKLEY. How many in your organization?
Mr. CARTER. Two thousand.
Senator BARKLEY. Is there any relationship between your
organization with 2,000 members and the organization of
controllers represented here yesterday with 2,000 members?
978 See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
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Mr. CARTER. None at all. We audit the controllers.
Senator BARKLEY. You audit the controllers?
Mr. CARTER. Yes; the public accountant audits the control-
ler's account.
Senator BARKLEY. Who audits you?
Mr. CARTER. Our conscience.
Senator BARKLEY. I am wondering whether after all a con-
troller is not for all practical purposes the same as an audi-
tor, and must he not know something about auditing?
Mr. CARTER. He is in the employ of the company. He is
subject to the orders of his superiors.
Senator BARKLEY. I understand. But he has got to know
something about auditing?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Senator BARKLEY. He has got to know something about
bookkeeping?
Mr. CARTER. But lie is not independent.
Senator REYNOLDS. Let me ask you this question, Colonel.
These companies are going to arrive at these figures through
their special auditors. All right. Now you want the members
of your organization to check up on their figures?
Mr. CARTER. As we do in many cases of industrial compa-
nies every year.
Senator REYNOLDS. All right. Then it goes to the Commis-
sion, does it not?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Senator REYNOLDS. Have they got to check their accounts
and your account?
Mr. CARTER. I do not think SO. I do not think they would
have to go to that.
Senator REYNOLDS. Why should your members ask that
they be permitted and empowered to check these accounts?
Mr. CARTER. Because it is generally regarded that an inde-
pendent audit of any business is a good thing.
Senator REYNOLDS. All right. Then after it goes to the
Commission they have to check up to see who is right; they
have to go through and audit again. There has to be a Gov-
ernment audit, as suggested by Senator Barkley. Would it not
be creating more difficulty and more expense and more
time for the Government if auditing organizations interest
themselves in these various and sundry corporations?
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Mr. CARTER. I do not think so. I think if a corporation
wished to issue some securities and had been employing in-
dependent public accountants for 20 years those account-
ants should be able to make this examination more eco-
nomically and quickly than the Government.
Senator REYNOLDS. Could they do it more economically
than the Government?
Mr. CARTER, I think so.
Senator GORE. There would not be any doubt about that.
Senator REYNOLDS. Why?
Mr. CARTER. We know the conditions of the accounts; we
know the ramifications of the business; we know the pitfalls
of the accounting structure that the company maintains. You
have got every kind of business to deal with. 579
This same argument resurfaces numerous times all the way to the pre-
sent, when it has been used to justify the provision of non-audit serv-
ices to audit clients—the familiarity that auditors have with their cli-
ents' enterprises puts them in the best position to provide the myriad
non-audit services; at the same time, the provision of non-audit serv-
ices is claimed to help the efficiency of the annual audit too. Of
course, this argument proves too much, as there then seems to be few
limits to what services auditors should be allowed to provide to their
ellen ts.38°
Senator REYNOLDS. Suppose that we decide in the final
passage of this bill here to employ five or six hundred audi-
tors from your organization, that would be all right, then,
would it not?
Mr. CARTER. I do not think the Government could employ
five or six hundred independent accountants.
Senator REYNOLDS. Why could they not?
Mr. CARTER. I do not think the type of men that are in the
public practice of accountancy would leave their present
practice to go in the Government employ.
Senator REYNOLDS. Well, if it were sufficiently remunera-
tive they would?
Mr. CARTER. Yes; if the Government made their time
worth while.
379 Hearings, supra note 1, at 57-59 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
580 See O'Connor, supra note 14, at 64.
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Senator REYNOLDS. The bill here provides for taking care
of the expenses incident thereto by way of registration.
Mr. CARTER. Well, you will have to build some more build-
ings in Washington to house them if you are going to do that.
Senator REYNOLDS. Then we had better not pass this bill at
al1. 381
This last exchange evidences contemplation of simply having the fed-
eral government perform the general audits, if any are to be clone.
Such proposals seem to have surfaced at least occasionally as the
statutory audit system developed under both the '33 Act and the '34
Act., but they are always deemed politically impossible. 582
Senator ADAMS. How much of a burden is this going to
put on a relatively small company? You were speaking a while
back of the companies whose stocks are listed being inde-
pendently audited. Now coming under the control of this
bill are going to be thousands of small companies putting
out an issue for their original financing. How much of a
burden and cost is that going to put on them?
Mr. CARTER. Very little measured in value to the investor
and to them. 383
This was a nice rhetorical flourish, but the senators do not appear to
be amused.
Senator GORE. What would be the range?
Mr. CARTER. My experience would be that the average
company pays around $500 or $600 or $700 for its auditing,
that is, taking the large and the small together.
Senator GORE. How often do they resort to that?
Mr. CARTER, Every year. And the largest organizations of
our country do it and have been doing it for the last 15 years.
Senator GORE. But they have not been available for any
public authority to examine and afford no safeguards?
Mr. CARTER. They have been published in their annual
reports and distributed to all of their stockholders, to the
newspapers and anyone who calls for them.
381 Hearings, supra note 1, at 59 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
382 See O'Connor, snpm note 14, at 47, 72-73.
363 Hearings, supra note 1, at 57 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
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Senator GORE. And have not clone any good?
Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir; I think they have.
Senator GORE, We have had all this debacle here in spite
of that.
Mr. CARTER. You still have sonic very sound companies
and industries in this country. 384
You have to admire Colonel Carter's tenacity on this one.
The CHAIRMAN. Most. of these people applying to be regis-
tered already have an independent audit. It is not necessary
to put them in the law. That is their practice now; that is,
they are supposed to have already.
Mr. CARTER. I think the trend has been decidedly in that
direction in the past five years, and especially in the last.
three years, and I certainly think it is a safeguard that should
not be discouraged.385
The Chairman, Senator Duncan Fletcher, makes an excellent point.
Colonel Carter rebuts it only by saying the trend "should not. be dis-
couraged," but there is a wide gulf between "not discouraging" and
congressionally mandating something. Publicly disclosed audits al-
ready were being employed by eighty-five percent of companies listed
on the NYSE, yet, as Senator Gore points out, this did not seem to do
much in terms of preventing, or even minimizing, the colossal failures
of the 1929 crash. At the same time, the Thompson draft, even
amended as Colonel Carter was requesting, would not have required
those companies already employing public audits to have done any-
thing differently. Given the widespread failures and stock price de-
cline of even surviving companies, this problem cannot be resolved
then by assuming that the audited companies all survived, and are in
better shape, than the non-audited companies.
This observation—together with the apparent fact that all of the
tweaking of auditor independence rules formulated by the SEC up
until Enron and other scandals did not prevent the myriad of audit
failures linked to compromised independence—provides grist for
anyone who wants to argue (hat mandatory disclosure and/or statu-
tory audits under the securities laws are unnecessary. Perhaps the sys-
tem simply helps keep people honest. Given the expense of compli-
ance, however, some might argue that from a cost-benefit perspective,
384 Id. at 59-60 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
385 Id. at 60 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
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mandatory disclosure and/or statutory audits are a failure and should
be substantially modified or completely eliminated. 588
 Additionally,
for all the hype surrounding it, at least one commentator has argued
that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 587 did not really change the dis-
closure system radically.388
Further, the combination of mandatory disclosure and statutory
audits should not necessarily be seen as a package deal. The '34 Act
simply authorized the SEC to determine whether the statutory man-
datory disclosures of issuers should also be certified by independent
auditors. A more robust reputational intermediary market may have
developed where audits were simply permissive and could serve as a
quality signaling best practice, rather than as the commodified loss
leader they appear to have become. 389
Senator GORE. Is this mandatory in England, the require-
ment that an independent accountant shall check up?
Mr. CARTER. All companies in England are required to be
audited by an independent accountant, who is present at the
stockholders' meeting and is available to answer any ques-
tions the stockholders wish to put to him.
Senator GORE. And they list the accountants that will be
acceptable?
Mr. CARTER. That is right.39°
388
 In the 1980s, there was a serious debate over the value of mandatory disclosure, but
the general consensus appears to have been that, on balance, it enhanced the functioning
of capital markets. For a synopsis of this debate, see MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES Rrou-
LATION 297-306 (4th ed. 2004). Recently, a modified form of this debate has arisen with
arguments for "issuer choice," in which companies need only comply with some disclosure
system somewhere in the world, not necessarily the U.S. system, even if the company's
stock is sold and/or traded in U.S. capital markets. See generally Stephen J. Choi & Andrew
T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. !•et. L. &
Bus. 207 (1996); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CA L. L. REV. 903 (1998); Merritt B. Fox,
Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA.
L. REV. 1335 (1999); Alan R. Palmiten Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999
COLLIN', Bus. L. REV. 1 (1999); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Alarket Approach to
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998).
387
 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15,
18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West Stipp. 2004)).
388 See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light
Reform (and ItJust Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003).
"9 See O'Connor, supra note 14, at 72 n.498.
39° Hearings, supra note 1, at 61-62 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
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This, of course, is simply wrong. The Companies Act, 1929, did not
require that accountants provide audits, much less "independent" ac-
countants—a notion that did not even seem to exist at the time in ei-
ther the Companies Acts generally or the ICAEW and ICAS as the
regulators of chartered accountants. 391 Colonel Carter's comments
further obscure the facts that the shareholders themselves elect the
auditor in the first place and that the auditor's report must be read
aloud at the annual meeting. Senator Gore, however, did seem to un-
derstand that the shareholders at least have some type of right to se-
lect. auditors. Finally, this exchange conflates the Companies Act,
1929's annual audit process with the separate, and different, require-
ment for certified profit and loss statements in prospectuses.
The remainder of Colonel Carter's testimony that concerned the
request for a general audit requirement covers the Banking Commit-
tee's continuing interrogation as to whether such a requirement will
acid to the merits review slant of the Thompson draft or even provide
a government-mandated tool that could be used to a filing company's
distinct disadvantage at the hands of competitors. 392 Overall, Colonel
Carter's session clearly did not go swimmingly well, and in fact, his
efforts may have backfired. The Senate not only neglected to add his
hoped for general audit provision, although perhaps not due to his
statements, but also removed the existing FTC audit. provision 1 393
Further, other than the original FTC audit provision, the Thomp-
son draft and its immediate revisions were silent as to accountants,
auditors, and audits. A later Senate report analyzing the bill expressly
mentions that parts of it, especially the information to be disclosed on
a registration statement, "follow[] to some extent that required in the
British act."394 Huston Thompson himself credits the Companies Act,
1929, among other laws, as a model in his testimony in the Banking
Committee hearings. 395 At this point, however, other than in the
House version of the bill, there were no audit provisions in the pro-
posed securities law. The bill, however, was very much alive in all
other respects in the Banking Committee.
As discussed above, however, for all intents and purposes the
Thompson draft was dead in the House, even as it still contained at
"I See supra notes 200-214 and accompanying text.
392 Sec Hearings, supra note 1, at 62 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
393 See S. REP. No. 73147 (1933) (text of reported bill), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL SECURI-
TIES LAWS: LEGISLA'rIVE HISTORY, supra note 361, at 13-14,43-44.
"4 Sec id. at 3 (text of accompanying report).
s" See Hearings, supra note I, at 56-62 (statement of Hon. Huston Thompson).
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least the FTC examination audit provision. President Roosevelt
quickly turned to his close and trusted friend Felix Frankfurter to
take over production of a new draft to be introduced in the House. 396
Felix Frankfurter, in turn, enlisted the help of James Landis, Benja-
min Cohen, .and Thomas Corcoran as a drafting team under his over-
sight (the "Landis-Cohen team"). 397
 After obtaining the consent of
Sam Rayburn, the Chair of the Commerce Committee, the Landis-
Cohen team went to work and drafted the core of the '33 Act in only a
few days.398
This core also was based expressly on the British Companies Act,
1929. 3" As such, and more in line with President Roosevelt's inten-
tions, it was centered solely on the goal of "full and fair disclosure"
rather than the more controversial merits based review contained in
the Thompson draft -to But whereas the Thompson draft was consis-
tent with the Companies Act, 1929's allowance of sales of securities
simply upon adequate registration with the Registry Office (U.S. of-
ferors would file with the FTC), the Landis-Cohen team added the
requirement for the so-called "waiting period." This allowed the FTC
to examine the registration statement and conduct examinations of
the issuer's records, if necessary, before the issuer could proceed to
actually sell the registered stock. 401
 This was quite a departure from
both the Companies Acts, 1929, and the Thompson draft, and created
many secondary effects upon the financial markets, including the use
of so-called "red herring" prospectuses during the waiting period. 02
The Landis-Cohen team also amended the provisions to require
specific information in the registration statement so that they were
"both tightened and expanded." 4° Additionally, the Landis-Cohen
596 SCC SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 57-58; Landis, supra note 359, at 33.
397 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 61; Landis, supra note 359, at 33-34. Dean Selig-
man suggests that Thomas Corcoran was not brought in so much to draft the legislation,
but rather to help lobby it through Congress. See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 63. James
Landis gives no such indication, although he does mention that the group often met with
Thomas Corcoran only at night because his duties prevented him from giving his full time
to this project.' Landis, supra note 359, at 37. Nonetheless, this Article adopts the conven-
tion of Dean Seligman to call the group the "Landis-Cohen team." See SELIGhiAN, supra
note 281, at 61.
958
 Sec SELIGMAN, SUM note 281, at 63; Landis, supra note 359, at 34.
399 Landis, supra note 359, at 34.
499 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 63; Landis, supra note 359, at 34-35. This Article
does not purport to give a detailed history of all the provisions of what would become the
'33 Act, but rather mainly focuses on the development of its audit provisions.
461
 See Landis, supra note 359, at 34-35.
402 Sec id. at 34-35 n.11.
403 Sec id. at 35.
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team "was particularly anxious through the imposition of adequate
civil liabilities to assure the performance by corporate directors and
officers of their fiduciary obligations and to impress upon account-
ants the necessity for independence and a thorough professional ap-
proach."404 In his later recollection of the legislative history of the '33
Act, James Landis noted that:
Despite the fact now generally recognized that the registra-
tion requirements of the Securities Act have introduced into
the accounting profession ethical and professional standards
comparable to those of other recognized professions, the
then dean of the accounting profession, George 0. May, of
Price, Waterhouse & Co. was strangely opposed to our pro-
posed requirements for independent accountantS. 4 °5
"Strangely opposed" indeedl George May would have been incensed
on two fronts: first, because the Landis-Cohen bill allowed the FTC to
set accounting standards and rules—a long-standing goal of the pro-
fession itself generally, and George May in particular; 40° second, be-
cause accountants now were enumerated specifically as those with
joint liability for nearly any defect in a registration statement that led
to an investor's lawsuit. 407
It is unclear whether the actual general audit provisions entered
the draft. at this point as well. Regardless, the Landis-Cohen team draft.
was presented to Sam Rayburn and the Commerce Committee on
April 10, 1933, as "perfecting amendments" to the Thompson draft,
so as to not offend Huston Thompson. 4°8 After approval, the team set
to work with Middleton Beaman, the House's chief draftsman, "to
hone the bill."4°9
Dean Seligman asserted that at this point Benjamin Cohen sug-
gested that the bill include a detailed schedule of data be included in
the registration statement. If so, then the general audit provisions
would likely have been introduced at this time as well. 41° In Dean
Seligman's account, James Landis vehemently countered this sugges-
tion by arguing that it was better to give the FTC general power to is-
104 Id.
105 Id. at 35n.12.
400 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 182, 191-92.
407 See id. at 192.
408 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 64; Landis, supra note 359, at 36.
409 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 64; Landis, supra note 359, at 37-38.
410 Sec SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 64.
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sue regulations in this regard. 4" Benjamin Cohen pushed back by ar-
guing that. James Landis's plan would risk ineffectual regulation.`112
Middleton Beaman allegedly gave the first resolution by "overruling
Cohen" on the grounds that it was best "to eliminate from the draft
any material not essential to the bill's structure." At this point, Ben-
jamin Cohen is alleged to have brought Felix Frankfurter into the
fray, and threatened to quit. 414
Unfortunately, Dean Seligman cites no clear support for the re-
ported exchange to this point.' 15
 He does, however, next cite a tele-
gram from Felix Frankfurter to President Roosevelt which appears to
support the contention that there was some important debate over
including such a schedule. The Frankfurter telegram of April 14,
1933, is cited as arguing that:
"[1] he omission of specific data to be disclosed would 'raise
needless questions of constitutionality as to delegation of
legislative power,' invite frustration of the bill's purposes by
hostile judicial interpretation, and jeopardize effective en-
forcement because of the enormous discretion it leaves to
the [FTC] ... thereby inviting laxity, favoritism, and indif-
ference. ' "416
Dean Seligman cited a subsequent telegram from Felix Frankfurter of
April 17, 1933, which thanked President Roosevelt for intervening
with Sam Rayburn on the bill. 417
 Felix Frankfurter also telegraphed
Benjamin Cohen around the same time, coaxing him to stay on the
project, and contacted Raymond Maley, a member of President Roo-
sevelt's administration and a supporter of the project, to help mend
fences between James Landis and Benjamin Cohen."
in contrast, James Landis, in his own account, professed not only
not to recall this heated dispute, but also not to recall exactly how the
crucial schedule came to be.'" He stated, "[The new draft] also con-
tains the device of schedules setting forth in detail the items of infor-







415 SCCSELIGNIAN, supra note 281, at 64.
418
 Id. at 64-65.
417
 Sec id. at 65.
418 See id.
419 Landis, supra note 359, at 38.
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tinct memory of the origins of that device. "420 His next comments,
however, suggest what might have happened:
I believe that [the device] was probably due to Beaman's de-
sire to eliminate from the draft material not essential to its
main structure. I do recall his comment that, handled as a
schedule, it would probably be glossed over by the conunit
tee after that committee had exhausted its patience on the
bill itself. In this he proved to be right. I believe, however,
that he knew as well as we that the core of the registration
requirements lay in those schedules. 421
This hardly sounds as if James Landis had opposed the inclusion of a
specific schedule of requirements generally—in fact, he clearly seems
to support it as a crucial part of the bill. Of course, James Landis's
memory could have been failing him on this matter. The more plau-
sible story is that the debate was perhaps only partly over whether to in-
clude the requirements at all, and partly over whether to include such
requirements, if included at all, within the body of the bill, or instead
to attach them as a schedule after the body of the bill as a separate
item."
The Landis-Cohen team members had already deferred once to
political expediency when they called their first draft "perfecting
amendments" to the Thompson draft. Perhaps now too, whether at.
Middleton Beaman's direct or indirect suggestion, or their own intui-
tion, they decided that the list of disclosure items for registration state-
ments would be too distracting or controversial if placed in the main
text. Alternatively, perhaps, there really was.a struggle between James
Landis and Benjamin Cohen as to the policy implications of placing
firm requirements in this bill, instead of including only enabling lan-
guage that delegated the specifics to the FTC. Either way, pushing the
requirements into a separate schedule might have been seen as a nice
compromise: the Commerce Committee and/or James Landis could
be appeased partly that the requirements were not technically part of
the bill text. Benjamin Cohen, and maybe James Landis, could feel
comfortable that the requirements had nonetheless been laid out as
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At the same time, use of the separate schedule "device" was hardly
unprecedented. In fact, arguably the schedule and much of its contents
had simply been lifted, with or without credit, directly from the Com-
panies Acts, where a forerunner had been introduced as early as the
Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856.422
 Originally; the removal of this ear-
lier version from the body of the prior Joint Stock Companies Act of
1844, as amended, into a separate table/schedule seemed to have been
part of the shift to establish these requirements as default provisions
that could be expressly modified by the company; either at its inception
or by special resolution later. 423
 The Companies Act, 1879, however,
brought many of these provisions, in particular the audit provisions,
back into the body of the text, presumably to emphasize that they were
binding again and not merely default rules. 424
Further, the Companies Act, 1928, as consolidated by the Com-
panies Act, 1929—which served as the acknowledged model for the
Landis-Cohen bill—included a Schedule IV that set out all the re-
quirements for information to be contained in any prospectus used by
a company to sell stock, including the new audit provision. 42' The re-
quirements of this Schedule IV, however, were no less mandatory than
other provisions included in the text of the statute. The eventual
Schedule A of the '33 Act bears some resemblance to Schedule IV,
and so, in some ways, it is not clear what all the preceding fuss was
about—no new conceptual ground was being broken by the "device"
of a schedule, nor for that matter, a specific set of requirements for
prospectuses (including some select audited financial statements).
Instead, at most, this may have been an argument over diverging from
the Companies Act, 1929 model/precedent either as to removing the
requirements altogether, or pushing them back into the body of the
bill, perhaps to give them even more force.
Regardless of how the schedule came to be included, the subse-
quent development of the Landis-Cohen draft is fairly well docu-
mented. The House Commerce Committee had created a subcommit-
tee under Sam Rayburn to bring the draft along in confidence until it
was suitable for "prime time. "420 An April 21, 1933, draft included the
delegation of power to the FTC to define accounting terms. 427 James
422
 Sec supra notes 138-143 and accompanying text.
423
 See supra notes 144-146 and accompanying text.
424 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
425 See supra note 197.
426 See StuGstAN, supra note 281, at 65; Landis, supra note 359, at 38-39.
427 See SELIGMAN, supra, note 281, at 65.
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Landis reported that they went through four more drafts, with limited
input of individual subcommittee members, and then two subcommit-
tee meetings, before anyone outside of the subcommittee was allowed
to meet with them to discuss the draft. 428 James Landis noted that nei-
ther of the subcommittee meetings led to any substantial changes.429
As the draft was ready to go to the full Commerce Committee, Sam
Rayburn acquiesced to letting a select group of top securities lawyers
review and comment on it in a closed door meeting. 43° This meeting
did not go particularly well, but appeared to result in only "a number
of technical changes particularly in the schedules to the bill that had
not had a thorough going over by the subcommittee." 431
From here, the bill went to the full Commerce Committee in a
public meeting on May 3, 1933. 432 Few changes were requested by that.
group, except for the addition of a couple of additional exemptions
from registration. 433 The bill was then reported out to the House on
May 4, 1933, and the next day, with relatively little debate, the bill was
unanimously adopted by that chamber. 434 The House Report of May
4, 1933, sets out the full text of this bill and shows inclusion of the full
Schedule A with registration statement requirements for a balance
sheet and a profit and loss statement, both to be certified by an inde-
pendent public or certified accountant. 435 Whether any of these inclu-
sions were the result, even in part, of the Institute's lobbying seems
unknowable on the existing record. Nonetheless, the accounting pro-
fession had indeed received what it had requested.
Ironically, this bill also reinstated the original Thompson draft
provision for the FTC to require that financial statements given to it.
pursuant to an examination during the waiting period be certified by
a public or certified public accountant approved by the F1'c.436 Given
the registration statement requirements under Schedule A, however,
this may seem redundant. The Schedule A provisions, however, do not.
423 See Landis, supra note 359, at 39.
429
	 id.
430 SI:LIGMAN, 51/PM note 28L at 65-66; Landis, supra note 359, at 39-40.
431 Landis, supra note 359, at 40-41.
432 Sec SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 66; Landis, supra note 359, at 41.
433 Landis, supra note 359, at 41.
134 Id.
49'3
	 REP. No. 73-85 (1933) (text of reported bill, H.R. 5480), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS: LEGISLATIVE HIS•RY 1933-1982, supra note 361, at 36-37. Of course, this
went further than the Companies Act, 1929 in two regards: (1) it required both certified
balance sheets and profit and loss statements, and (2) it required that those certified state•
meats be filed with the FTC, rather than simply be included in the prospectus. See id.
498 See id. at 16.
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require the accountant to be approved by the FTC. Thus, this may
indicate a continuing skepticism as to the reliability of company cho-
sen auditors. Such auditors might be acceptable for the routine regis-
tration statement filing, but where the suspicion of the FTC is aroused
about the verity of that filing, it may initiate an investigation that, inter
cilia, requires a new audit to be conducted by an FTC approved audi-
tor. This concept of routine filings coupled with adversarial, or what
might be deemed "forensic," audits may well suggest a better model
for the use of auditors in securities regulation in the future.
As to the scope of the provisions of Schedule A, there is no doubt
that it is more extensive than its counterpart, Part II of Schedule IV, of
the Companies Act, 1929. At the same time, not too much should be
made of this expansion because, as discussed above, 437 the Companies
Act, 1929, brings together all of the major legislative areas regarding
corporations and their securities, and thus requires other sorts of in-
formation in other schedules, forms, and provisions of that act. In to-
tal, these arguably cover the same ground as the single Schedule A,
which at the time was to be the only chance that federal authorities
would get to compel companies to disclose information.
Meanwhile, in the Senate, the revised Thompson bill was still
percolating along in the Banking Committee. 438 During April, it had
been amended substantially to withdraw many of the most nettlesome
provisions such that the Banking Committee's chairman would pro-
claim it to be quite similar to the Landis-Cohen bill. 439 Felix Frank-
furter attempted to have the Senate bill withdrawn in late April, but to
no avail—it was reported out to the Senate on April 27, 1933. Despite
further efforts by Felix Frankfurter, with the assistance of Raymond
Moley on approval from President Roosevelt, passage of the Thomp-
son bill in the Senate was merely delayed, but ultimately achieved on
May 8, 1933.440 Somewhat out of the blue, however, an entire second
pan purporting to form a federal Corporation of Foreign Security
Holders was tacked on just before passage. 441
All of these events presented a bit of a sticky wicket for the pro-
moters of the House's Landis-Cohen bill, including President Roose-
velt himself. 442 Nonetheless, as the two chambers prepared to send
"7 Sec supra notes 106-238 and accompanying text.
415 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 67.
4" See id.
140 Sec id. at 67-68.
141 See id. at 68-69; Landis, supra note 359, at 43.
412 Landis, supra note 359, at 43.
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their delegates to meet in Conference Committee to hammer out the
final version of the bill, enough politicking was achieved in the back-
ground so that the delegates could have a "free hand" in fashioning
the final version, all under the chairmanship of Sam Rayburn, and at
the concession of Senator Fletcher. 443 In the proceedings of the Con-
ference Committee, the Thompson draft part of the Senate bill was
quickly dropped, while the House's Landis-Cohen bill was adopted as
the basic working draft. 441 Somewhat oddly, although likely another
political expediency, the tacked on amendment to the Senate bill was
retained. 445 After four more drafts containing amendments that weak-
ened sonic of the regulatory provisions a bit, but with Schedule A in-
tact, the final bill came out of Conference Committee, passed both
houses of Congress, and was signed into law on May 27, 1933. 446
IV. AFTERMATH
A. The '34 Act and the SEC
A little more than a year after passage of the '33 Act, President
Roosevelt was also able to get Congress to pass a second component
of his ambitious reform plan in the form of the '34 Act. 447 This latter
legislation was intended to regulate the stock exchanges, and many
of their key players like brokers and dealers. 448 It also regulated the
so-called secondary market in which issuer stock was traded amongst.
members of the public after it initially was purchased directly from
the issuer, often via underwriters, in a public offering. 449
The '33 Act itself was also amended, largely to cut back on what.
were perceived to be excessive liabilities imposed on company man-
agement and the directors they relied on, such as accountants. 45° In a
nutshell, the legitimate concern of those facing the prospective liabili-
ties under the original '33 Act was that the liability seemed limited
neither to the harmed party's reliance on the defective statements
443 SCCSELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 69; Landis, supra note 359, at 43-45.
444 Landis. supra note 359, at 43-45.
4" Id. Although a provision was added to stay the effectiveness of the amendment's pro-
visions unless and until there was a presidential proclamation doing so, this apparently never
happened. SeeSELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 70; Landis, supra note 359, at 48-49.
446 SCCSELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 69-70; Landis, supra note 359, at 95-48,49.
447 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 73-100; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Pub. L. No. 73-291,48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-781111h (2000)).
448 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-781111h.
449 See id.
450 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 99-400.
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and certifications in the prospectus nor to the direct causal role that
such statements and certifications may have played in the actual harm
alleged. 451
 Adding to the pain, the liability provisions provided no cap
to damages other than the price at which the security was offered to
the public. 452
 George May expressed the indignation of the account-
ing profession:
"I cannot believe that a law is just or can be long maintained
in effect which deliberately contemplates the possibility that a
purchaser may recover from a person from whom he has not
bought, in respect of a statement which at the time of his
purchase he had not read, contained in a document which
he did not then know to exist, a sum which is not to be meas-
ured by injury resulting from falsity in such statement. Yet,
under the Securities Act as it stands, once a material mis-
statement or omission is proved, it is no defense to show that
the plaintiff had no knowledge of the statement in question
or of the document in which it was contained, or that the fall
in the value of the security which he has purchased is due,
not to the misstatement or omission complained of, but to
quite different causes, such as the natural progress of inven-
tion, or even fire or earthquake. The Securities Act not only
abandons the old rule that the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff, but the doctrine of contributory negligence and the
seemingly sound theory that there should be some relation
between the injury caused and the sum to be received."453
James Landis, however, is quoted with a specific response to ac-
countants regarding their new liability under the '33 Act at. a meeting
of the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants:
"It has been said, and very rightly in my humble opinion, that
accounting is after all a matter of opinion rather than any-
thing else. But though this may he true I have still to see the
case of a prospective investor being offered a balance sheet
and having it carefully explained to him that this or that item
is merely an opinion or deduction from a series of other opin-
ions mixed in with a few acknowledged facts. But the fact is
that accountancy has paraded too largely as an exact science.
451 CAREY, supra note 23, at 192; SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 94-100.
452 15 U.S.C. § 77(g).
453 CAREY, supra note 23, at 192 (quoting comments of George May).
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Accountancy, as distinguished from law, has generally been
portrayed as an exact science, and its representations have
been proffered to the unlearned as representations of fact.
and not of opinion. If it insists upon such fact representations,
it is, of course, fair that it should be burdened with the re-
sponsibility attendant upon such a portrayal of its results."454
These are tough statements to make to a room full of CPAs, but.
James Landis apparently did not have a reputation for being particu-
larly warm and fuzzy. 455 Nonetheless, the edges of the perceived ex-
cesses of the '33 Act were softened by amendments introduced as part
of the '34 Act. 456 In part, these amendments were due to a return of
the public sentiment pendulum closer. to the center and away from
the extremes it reached while the glaring spotlights of the Pecora In-
vestigation highlighted every last peccadillo of members of the
financial services industry. 457 This allowed members of that industry
to regroup and mount a responsive campaign against what they per-
ceived to be the tougher provisions of the '33 Act and proposed fol-
low-on legislation, such as the '34 Act'!" Thus, the '34 Act itself has
been described as much more the result of compromise among the
affected parties than was the originally enacted version of the '33
Act. 459
Perhaps owing to this compromising nature of the '34 Act, or even
perhaps to the delegation theory allegedly espoused by James Landis in
the drafting of the '33 Act, the '34 Act sets out less detail and gives the
new SEC more power to engage in rulemaking to flesh out specifics
than its predecessor did.460 In particular, the '34 Act requires annual
financial reporting, and allows for additional or more frequent report-
ing, of publicly traded companies under implementing rules to be
promulgated by the SEC.'" Interestingly, these reports are not required
to be certified or audited under the provisions of the '34 Act itself, but
454 Id. at 193 (quoting James M. Landis, Speech to the New York State Society of Cer-
tified Public Accountants (1933)).
455 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 63-65.
456 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77m, 770.
457 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 20-38.
458 Sec id. at 76-77,89-93.
459 See id. at 99-100.
466 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-781 (covering Securities Exchanges, SEC Rules of
Practice, and Investor Protection). The '34 Act also created the SEC, which then is to over-
see and to enforce both the '33 Act and the '34 Act in place of the FTC. Id.
461 See id. §§ 78j-78n. Section 78m of the '34 Act deals especially with financial report-
ing. Id. § 78m.
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rather the decision to require certification is left to the SEC. 462 The
SEC, of course, did choose to promulgate rules requiring annual, quar-
terly, and "material event" reporting, with annual reports to be certified
by an independent public or certified accottntant. 463
B. The Problem ofAuditor Independence
With the passage of both the '33 Act and '34 Act, however, ac-
countants reached another major milestone and achieved a much de-
sired goal—they could now argue that their's was a prestigious profes-
sion recognized by Congress as playing an important public role in
the fair administration of the vast financial services sector. In fact,
Chief Justice Warren Burger would sum up this role for them decades
later in the landmark 1904 U.S. Supreme Court case of United States v.
Arthur Young &
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a cor-
poration's financial status, the independent accountant as-
sumes a public responsibility transcending any employment
relationship with the client. The independent public ac-
countant performing this special function owes ultimate al-
legiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders as
well as the investing public. This "public watchdog" function
demands that the accountant maintain total independence
from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to
the public trust. 464
Between enactment of the '34 Act and the Young case, however,
the SEC would wield its exclusive power to define who qualifies as an
"independent public or certified accountant" to achieve virtual regula-
tion of CPAs—at least those who wanted to perform the initially stable
and lucrative statutory audits for publicly traded corporate clients. 465
Nevertheless, as accountants' engagements with audit clients became
multi-faceted—including tax work, consulting, and an ever-increasing
array of other non-audit services—the SEC's job making sure the ac-
countant-as-auditor was "independent" of the client, so as to be able
to render an objective and accurate opinion, became ever more
462 See id. § 78m(a) (2) (stating that such annual reports
	 , certified if required by the
rules and regulations of the [SEC] by independent public accountants" (emphasis
added)).
465
 Regulation 13A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, -13 (2004).
464 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984).
465 See O'Connor, supra note 14, at 8-10.
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difficult.. 466 The result was a labyrinthian compendium of principle,
rules, interpretations, and no-action letters whose sole constant fea-
ture seemed to be change.467 The most recent revision to this bramble
bush is the auditor independence provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002. 468 Now, any such certification or audit required by the
SEC must be performed by a "registered public accounting firm" who
must register with a new quasi-public body; the Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board (the "PCAOB"), and comply with a new set
of independence rules that overlap with the existing SEC rules.469
Adding to this confusion, the accounting profession has long had
its own independence rules as established by the AICPA in its Code of
Professional Conduct.47° Yet, in the wake of Enron and other scandals,
none of these myriad sources and details of independence regulation
appear to have been fully effective. 4" Of course, it may be too soon to
tell whether the "new" independence regime under Sarbanes-Oxley
will prove more effective than its predecessors. This is unlikely, how-
ever, as the "new" regime largely seems simply to import the existing
SEC independence rules into the statutory codification of the '34
Act. 472 While this "promotion" from "mere" rides to statutory lan-
guage may have some enforcement value, it may not be enough to
overcome the widely acknowledged problems and failures of the exist-
ing auditor independence regulatory mechanism.473
466 See id. at 53-70.
467 See id. at 10-23. The codification of these rules is at (1) Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R.
§§210.2-01(b)—(c) (2004), and (2) Codification of Financial Reporting Policies §§ 601-
602, reprinted in SEC Accounting Rules (CCH) 13872, at 3796. The Codification of
Financial Reporting Policies is not intended to supplant the rules set forth in Regulation S-
X, but is intended instead only to supplement those rules.
466 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15,
18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West Stipp. 2004)).
466 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78j-78n. Note that section 78m(a) (2) still refers to "independent
public accountants." Sec id. § 78m (a) (2).
470 Am. INST. or CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, CODE or PROFESSIONAL. C.oNnucT,
http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/index.htm (last visited Oct, 1, 2004); see also O'Connor,
supra note 14, at 24-37.
471 See O'Connor, supra note 14, at 1-3. Sec gcnenilly William W. Bratton, Enron, Sar-
hancs-Oxley, and Accounting: Rules l'ersus Principles Versus Rents, 48 Vim. L. Rix. 1023 (2003);
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 Bus. LAw.
1403 (2002); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting's Burden: Business Lawyers in
Enron's Dar* Shadows, 57 Bus. LAW. 1421 (2002).
472 Cunningham, supra note 388, at 918-19, 943-54; see also Bratton, supra note 471, at .
1031-32.
4" Lawrence A. Cunningham also suggests that Sarbanes-Oxley was really a way for
Congress to appear to be doing something profound in rapid response to the corporate
and financial services meltdown after Enron and other scandals, white in fact doing noth-
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Accordingly, there is little reason to believe that the critical prob-
lems of auditor independence will be remedied by "tweaking" the
current system. If this cannot be done, however, then what might be
done instead?
C. Be Careful What You Wish For
In short, the problem of auditor independence was created by
the federal securities laws: initially, through the statutory audit provi-
sion for prospectuses in the '33 Act, and then exacerbated by the de
facto extension of this audit to an annual requirement under the '34
Act. In particular, the small change from the Companies Ads prece-
dents of shareholder election of "auditors"—as that term was under-
stood in the British tradition—to the unspecified method of retaining
"independent public or certified accountants" in the '33 Act and '34
Act (together, the "Securities Laws"), set off a cascade of negative ef-
fects that leveraged off the broad cultural differences in accounting
and auditing on different sides of the Atlantic.
To recap, the British tradition of audits is based on a principal's
employ of a trusted agent to check up on the disposition of the prin-
cipal's assets and affairs. 474
 This is a straight agency relationship that
has loose connections with agency accounting theories—although the
concept of "auditor" is not coextensive with that of "accountant." In
some cases the auditor was working for a single principal, in other
cases the auditor might have been working on behalf of a class of per-
sons, but in all cases the auditor's services were provided towards what
should be a unitary set of interests. 475
 Later, even as business account-
ing theories such as proprietorship and entity accounting developed,
the role of the auditor did not necessarily follow. Rather, the auditor
continued to work on behalf of individuals or classes with a unitary set
of interests, such as shareholders.' 76
In the later developing American tradition, however, "auditors"
were nearly always accountants and their audits often were used by
ing and preserving the status quo until either the crisis subsided or it could figure out the
"right* thing to do, Cunningham, supra note 388, at 979-80.
474
 See supra notes 22-230 and accompanying text.
475 See supra notes 106-230 and accompanying text. An example is the townspeople
checking up on their local municipal treasurer. See supra notes 106-230 and accompanying
text.
476 cf. William W. 8ratton, Shareholder Value, Financial Conservatism, and Auditor Independ-
ence, 53 DUKE L.J. 439, 446-62 (2003) (arguing that even subsets of current shareholders
may have different needs and goals regarding audits and financial statement disclosure).
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multiple parties with clearly distinct interests. 477 Titus, the theories of
proprietorship and entity accounting may have had more impact on
American auditors. In the former, the accountant/auditor was to dis-
tinguish between all of a natural person's financial affairs—business
and personal—taken together, and those specific assets implicated
directly in a defined, ongoing proprietary enterprise. 478 In the latter,
the accountant/auditor distinguished between an agency relationship
with one or more natural persons, and one with a corporation or
other legal, but non-natural person . 479
Further, whereas the British system has unitary sources of regula-
tion for both corporations and chartered accountants, the American
system consists of a confusing, and sometimes conflicting, pastiche of
varying state laws concerning corporations and CPAs, partially pre-
empted by federal laws in limited domains such as securities regula-
tion. This likely made it difficult for any cultural tradition regarding
audits and auditors to develop and may be yet another reason why
American accountants and lawmakers continually looked to the Brit-
ish Companies Acts for guidance.
As one might expect, however, problems arise when specific pro-
visions are lifted—anti modified—from their place in a coherent and
comprehensive whole. To be fair, President Roosevelt and his New
Dealers appeared to want to move all corporate and accounting regu-
lation to the federal level, but they were unable to do so. Their failure
perhaps led to a worst of both worlds situation in which rules for ac-
countants were removed partially from their existing location in state
law and placed in a federal system without the necessary surrounding
provisions that provided such critical context as they did for the Brit-
ish audit system.
Paramount in this surrounding context was the conceptual sepa-
ration of the auditor and accounting roles, and the allegiance of the
auditor to the owners (shareholders) of the company. The centuries-
old British audit tradition, combined with the placement of hiring
and compensation power in the hands of the principal(s) under the
Companies Acts, created an environment in which it was clear what.
the auditor's role was and for whom the auditor was working. When
the Securities Laws left it open as to who would hire and set compen-
sation for the auditors, this responsibility fell to management and/or
477 See supra notes 239-310 and accompanying text.
478 Sec supra note 30.
479 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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the board of directors—the very parties upon whom the auditors were
supposed to be checking tip onl Further, the statutory language sim-
ply directing companies to have certain financial statements certified
by an independent public or certified accountant minimized the
richer tradition of the British auditor as an officer of the company,
working on behalf of shareholders.
Not surprisingly, the audit system established under the Securities
Laws instead created a culture in which outside accountants are hired
merely to perform a professional service to certify financial state-
ments on behalf of the "company," with a host of implied duties to
creditors, directors, and the "investing public," not to mention a duty
to shareholders and possibly even employees. Of course, all of these
groups of beneficiaries have markedly different interests. Thus, the
American accountant/auditor is placed in the untenable position of
the agent serving many masters with conflicting interests. In such an im-
broglio, is it any wonder that the group who hires, fires, and sets
compensation for the auditor becomes the de facto client? Over time,
laudable efforts to establish protections such as audit committees of
company boards that would insulate auditors from the direct influ-
ence of management have been instituted. These still fail, however, to
take the simple step of pushing control of the audit relationship back
to shareholders where it belongs.
It is not clear why the Landis-Cohen team chose to include an au-
dit provision for prospectuses that clearly was derived from the Com-
panies Act, 1929, yet was altered in such crucial ways. Perhaps they felt
that ihe very lack of a comprehensive federal corporation regulating
mechanism such as the Companies Act, 1929, would create problems
for a more closely followed audit provision because the '33 Act was not
broad enough in scope to dictate a general auditor for stock issuing
companies. Alternatively, perhaps the team felt it would be more palat-
able to modify the British audit to more closely track the developing
American corporate practice of publicly disclosed audits (such as Colo-
nel Carter argued, albeit unpersuasively, to the Banking Committee).
Regardless of how it came to be, the form of the audit provision set
out in the enacted '33 Act was then picked up by the '34 Act and the
SEC rules promulgated thereunder, This set in place the American
form, which has subsequently proved to be extremely difficult to dis-
lodge. Further, by mandating what was arguably a useful quality signal-
ing best practice, the Securities Laws turned it into a mere commod-
ity—a cost of doing business that should be dispensed with as cheaply
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as possible. 480 Over time, as one would predict, the profit margins for
statutory audits became razor thin as the service was transformed from
a premium into a commodity—th some accounts, it has actually been
run as a loss leader simply to give accountants access to corporate deci-
sionmakers in the quest for premium consulting engagements. 481
At the same time, while it has been endlessly "tweaked," the core
structure of the American audit, replete with all the independence
issues it creates, remains firmly in place. Beyond suggesting to replace
it with one more closely modeled after the British system—in particu-
lar, placing control of the audit relationship in the hands of the
shareholders—this Article does not examine whether the British sys-
tem is in fact demonstrably better than the American system. Rather,
it simply starts from the premise that the American system has not
worked particularly well and argues that this failure is due to the mis-
application of the British precedent. Accordingly, any true solution
for the problem of auditor independence must start from when and
how it was created—a story that this Article does explore in detail,
Ironically, the American system has not worked out that well for
the accountants either. To be sure, they received a government-
mandated windfall concession, and this concession may well have led
to the phenomenal growth and consolidation of the major accounting
firms.482 Although perhaps not as an intentional quid pro quo, how-
ever, the Landis-Cohen team also saddled the accountants with sub-
stantial liabilities for their choice role in the securities issuing process.
Additionally, perhaps more importantly, the profession has been hob-
bled ever since by the fast-growing complexities and limitations in-
volved in maintaining auditor independence—even as the largest
firms transformed themselves into international professional services
behemoths. Currently, the Big Four firms continue to wrestle with
what to do with their lucrative consulting divisions—the very divisions
that also create the most visible independence challenges through
provision of non-audit services to audit clients.
193 SCC O'CO/11101', supra note 14, at 62-63.
481
 Sec Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements. 17 CFR fats.
210, 240, § III(C) (2) (a) (i) (2001) (codifying Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7919, 34-43602,
35-27279, 1C-24744, IA-1911, and FR-56 (Nov. 21, 2000)), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/final/33-7919.1nm (last modified Oct. 12, 2001); Arthur Levitt, Renewing the Cove-
nant with Investors, Speech at New York University Center for Law and Business (May 10,
2000), at http://wwwsec.gov/news/speech/spch370.1utm (last modified May 26, 2000).
482 See O'Connor, supra note 14, at 68-69.
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Ask members of the former Arthur Andersen about the problems
of audits and independence. Even before the Enron debacle that re-
sulted in its criminal conviction and implosion, the firm had suffered
through a nasty divorce from its consulting arm, Andersen Consulting
(now Accenture). 483
 This divorce, however, was arguably the culmina-
tion of the growth of the audit and tax services under the substantial
business generated by both the income tax law of 1913 and the Secu-
rities Laws, which in turn led to the firm's ability to create and grow
the consulting practices.4
 Yet, hemmed in by independence rules,
the consulting services could not fully prosper until the firm secured
a unique no-action letter from the SEC blessing a novel separation of
the firm into two distinct legal entities—one for tax and audit and
one for consuIting. 485
 Neither controlled the other, but both were
"coordinated," along with the firm's overseas legal entities, through
contracts established with yet another entity, the Swiss-based Andersen
Worldwide. 486
Over time, the partners at Andersen Consulting came to resent
the obligations they had to the Arthur Andersen member firms
through the Andersen Worldwide Organization. In particular, the
Andersen Consulting partners felt that their earnings were being un-
fairly targeted by the profit-sharing provisions of the inter-firm
agreements (even though the net flow of money had been reversed
earlier in the organization's history). They also felt that the Arthur
Andersen member firms were creating harmful competition within
the Andersen Worldwide Organization by allegedly developing new
consulting divisions.487
 Eventually, they sought and received an arbi-
tration award that allowed them simply to walk away from the world-
wide Andersen family of firms. 488
 This was a major blow to the U.S.
483 See id. at 57-58.
484
 See Final Award, Andersen Consulting Bus. Unit Member Firms n Arthur Andersen Bus.
Unit Member Firms & Andersen Worldwide Societe Coop., Intl Comm. Arb. 4-25 (2000) (No.
9797/CK/AER/ACS) [hereinafter Final Award]; see also ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., A Vt-
S ION OF GRANDEUR 84, 92-93 (giving a history of Arthur Andersen & Co., published by the
firm for its seventy-fifth anniversary).
433
 See Arthur Andersen & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 79,484, at 77,457 ( June 20, 1990).
488
 See Final Award, supra note 484, at 10-14; AwrituR ANDERSEN & CO., supra note 484,
at 84, 92-93. Of historical note, Harvey Pitt, then of Fried Frank, and later SEC Chairman,
signed the no-action letter request for allowance of this convoluted structure—although it
is unclear what role he played in creation of the structure. See Arthur Andersen & Co.,
supra note 485, at 77,457.
437 See Final Award at 4-25, 116-18.
433 See id.
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Arthur Andersen entity and arguably played some role in the subse-
quent downward spiral of the firm. Even as it then attempted to grow
a sort of replacement consulting division, Arthur Andersen Business
Consulting, within the Arthur Andersen entity, the firm became in-
creasingly mired in independence issues. It also faced the same ap-
parent general decline in profitability of the once dependable cash
cow statutory audit that the other members of the then-Big Five
faced.489 It is difficult to tell what proportional role all of these factors
played in the demise of Arthur Andersen, but in the end they collec-
tively killed the firm.
Thus, the very thing the accounting profession so desired at the
dawn of the twentieth century-4o be acknowledged as a "true" pro-
fession and entrusted with an important and respected role in soci-
ety—may well have led it to accept, and even advocate for, its Achilles'
heel of auditor independence. To be held to the higher standard that
arguably separates a "profession" from a mere business enterprise,
however, one must then live up to that standard, perhaps even when it.
means declining lucrative engagements and diminishing the bottom
line. Or, maybe it is just another Great Gatsby-type story, in which an
all-consuming desire to "better one's position" in life blinds the pro-
tagonist to the reality of life beyond the clock with the green light. 490
At any rate, in postscript then, be careful what you wish for—you
might actually get it.
469 Sec supra note 479.
493 Sec generally F. Starr FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY (Chelsea House Publishers
1986) (1925).
